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NO MORE SPLITTING: USING A FACTUAL
INQUIRY TO DETERMINE SIMILAR MOTIVE
UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
804(b)(1)
I. INTRODUCTION
After dropping out of high school, John Olinger opened a small
home remodeling company in Northern Indiana. 1 John‘s company is not
extremely lucrative; however, John‘s wife works as a secretary and their
salaries combined amount to just enough to provide for their three
teenage children and to pay their monthly mortgage.
John and his wife recently purchased a small two-bedroom home
near Roosevelt High School so that their children would not have to
attend Jackson High School. John and his wife did not want their
children to attend Jackson because the school is infamous for having
academic deficiencies, gang problems, and high drop-out rates. John
insisted that his children attend Roosevelt because, as a high school
drop-out, John did not want his children to follow in his path.
John and his family had a good life; however, on June 16, 2008,
John‘s life took a turn for the worst. A grand jury indicted John and two
others in the Northern District of Indiana for conspiracy to commit
fraud, embezzlement, and extortion. If the jury convicts John, he faces
ten to twenty years in prison, and he will miss out on being with his
children during their critical years of development. Moreover, if John‘s
family loses his income, his wife will not be able to make the mortgage
payment and the family will likely move in with his sister, forcing his
children to attend Jackson High School and live in a crowded house.
Needless to say, if convicted, life for John, his wife, and his three
children will take a dramatic shift.
Before John‘s trial began, the other two defendants accepted plea
bargains with the government and agreed to cooperate with the
government if necessary. During the trial, John called both of the
defendants to testify, but each asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to
testify. Subsequently, the prosecution called a witness who gave
testimony incriminating John and portraying him as the mastermind
behind the whole conspiracy. The witness‘s testimony contradicted the
other two defendants‘ grand jury testimony, which admitted that John
did not actively participate in the conspiracy, and that they were the
brains behind the operation. John attempted to admit the grand jury
testimony under Rule 804(b)(1); however, the district court held that the
1

This fact pattern is a hypothetical created by the author.
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exculpatory grand jury testimony did not satisfy the similar motive
requirement of Rule 804(b)(1). Therefore, the district court did not allow
John to use the testimony to persuade the jury of his innocence.
John and his attorney promptly appealed the district court‘s decision
not to admit the exculpatory grand jury testimony. John argues that the
prosecutor‘s motive during the grand jury proceeding and at trial did
not differ because the prosecutor always had the same goal—to extract
testimony incriminating John. On the other hand, the prosecutor argues
that there was no similar motive during the grand jury proceeding
because of the lower burden of proof and the ability to call only
witnesses the prosecutor wants to examine. Furthermore, the prosecutor
argues that there is no incentive to question a witness heavily during a
grand jury proceeding because the prosecutor might not want to give up
important information about an ongoing investigation, and if the
prosecutor finds out the witness is lying, he can bring a perjury charge
later. Both sides made all of these arguments in briefs before the Seventh
Circuit and are awaiting the court‘s decision on how to interpret the
similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1).
Appellate courts are currently split on how to determine whether
exculpatory grand jury testimony satisfies the similar motive
requirement of Rule 804(b)(1). One of the approaches consistently finds
that the government does not have a similar motive during a grand jury
proceeding as it does at trial, while the other approach consistently finds
that the government‘s motive during a grand jury proceeding is similar
to its motive at trial. This Note proposes a set of factors for courts to
examine when deciding whether to admit exculpatory grand jury
testimony. First, Part II of this Note provides an introduction to the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the background and purpose of the
hearsay rule, followed by the former testimony exception of the hearsay
rule and the two different approaches circuit courts take when deciding
whether to admit exculpatory grand jury testimony. 2 Second, Part III
discusses the positive and negative aspects of the different
interpretations of similar motive.3 Finally, Part IV proposes factors for
courts to use as guidance to decide whether to admit exculpatory grand
jury testimony.4

2
See infra Part II (giving a background to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the hearsay
rule, former testimony exception, and the two different approaches courts take to
determine whether to admit exculpatory grand jury testimony).
3
See infra Part III (describing the positive and negative consequences of the two
different approaches courts use to interpret similar motive).
4
See infra Part IV (suggesting how the courts should decide whether to admit
exculpatory grand jury testimony).
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II. BACKGROUND
America‘s judicial system ensures due process and guarantees the
right to a fair trial for everyone. 5 The laws are meant to apply equally to
all, and ideally all courts should interpret laws the same way. 6 Part of
receiving a fair trial includes the right to examine witnesses and present
evidence, which is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence in federal
court.7 The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to promote
fairness and to provide consistency in determining what evidence is
admissible during trial.8 However, courts interpreting Rule 804(b)(1) are
anything but consistent, and how the rule applies depends on which
court is interpreting the rule.9 First, Part II.A and Part II.B offer an

5
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (ensuring that the accused has an opportunity to confront
and examine witnesses). The Sixth Amendment also guarantees the right to counsel and
notice of the crime being charged. Id. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee
that the accused receives due process before being convicted of a crime. U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV. See generally Neb. Press Ass‘n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 616 (1976) (stating
that the accused is innocent until proven guilty).
6
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally Introduction, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/Desktop
Default.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) (attempting to create
uniformity in laws amongst the states by creating Uniform and Model Acts). Uniformity in
the law makes the legal life of businesses and people simpler because people know how the
law will apply and what to expect. Id.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also FED. R. EVID. 101 (stating that the Federal Rules of
Evidence apply to proceedings in all courts of the United States, bankruptcy judges, and
United States magistrate judges).
8
FED. R. EVID. 102. Judges must use the Federal Rules of Evidence to ensure fairness,
prevent waste and delay, and promote the growth of the law so justice is served. Id.
9
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Rule 804(b)(1), commonly called the former testimony
exception, makes normally inadmissible hearsay admissible. Id. Rules 804(b)(1) reads:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another
hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken
in compliance with law in the course of the same or another
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or,
in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct,
cross, or redirect examination.
Id. Compare United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 12–13 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting the
defendant‘s argument that his state grand jury testimony should not be admitted because
the prosecutor‘s motive to cross-examine him was not the same during trial), with United
States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the government possessed
the same motive during the grand jury as it did during trial because during each
proceeding the government attempted to get testimony incriminating the defendant). See,
e.g., 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 304 (6th ed. 2006) (stating that
the circuit courts appear to be in disagreement over whether grand jury exculpatory
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introduction to the Federal Rules of Evidence and provide the purpose
and background of the hearsay rule.10 Second, Part II.B.1 introduces
Rule 804(b)(1), the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule, and
explains the rule.11 Finally, Part II.B.2.a and Part II.B.2.b explore the two
different approaches circuit courts take when a defendant attempts to
admit exculpatory grand jury testimony under the former testimony
exception.12
A. Introduction to the Federal Rules of Evidence
Every day in trials across the country, witnesses take the stand and
testify about their knowledge or recollection of facts relevant to a
disputed legal issue.13 The ability to call witnesses during a lawsuit is
one of the most crucial aspects of a fair trial.14 Lawsuits are largely
dependent upon facts, and many times the only way to prove a fact is
with witness testimony.15 However, witnesses testifying during a trial
cannot tell their story any way they want. 16 Witnesses are often
interrupted by lawyers arguing about legal admissibility issues, and then
the judge may rule on the dispute and restrict the matters the witness
may address in his testimony.17
testimony meets Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive requirement) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
10
See infra Part II.A. and Part II.B (discussing the Federal Rules of Evidence and
providing a background to the hearsay rule).
11
See infra Part II.B.1 (providing an explanation of the former testimony exception to the
hearsay rule).
12
See infra Part II.B.2.a and Part II.B.2.b (explaining the broad and narrow interpretations
of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive requirement).
13
DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 2 (2d ed.
2008). The trial gives the parties a formal setting to express their differing views and
opinions, while also resolving the conflict and attempting to achieve justice. Id.
14
Id. Lawyers constantly try to reveal witness testimony and other evidence favorable
to their side, and if the testimony or evidence is not favorable, lawyers try to use the
Federal Rules of Evidence to prevent the evidence from reaching the jury. Id.
15
See Maurice Possley, A Witness’s Role, AMERICA.GOV (July 1, 2009),
http://www.america.gov/st/usg-english/2009/July/20090706174632ebyessedo0.9546885.
html (arguing that witness testimony is very important to deciding a case and witness
testimony has the power to influence the emotions of a jury to persuade them how to
decide the case).
16
LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 1.
17
Id. During trials:
People who know what happened are not allowed simply to tell the
story in the way they see fit. Instead, lawyers often rudely interrupt a
witness‘s narrative to argue about arcane legal issues. At the end of
these arguments the judge might instruct the witness not to talk about
certain things or to talk about them in one way but not another, all
without ever explaining why. The lawyers further control the telling
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The purpose of witness testimony during trials is to discover the
truth and get to the bottom of a disputed legal issue. 18 Consequently,
witnesses are only permitted to testify about facts relevant to the
underlying legal controversy.19 Evidence is relevant if it has any
tendency to increase or decrease the likelihood that a fact is true. 20 Just
because evidence is relevant, however, does not necessarily mean the
evidence is admissible.21 Introducing evidence during a trial can be a
very difficult process, but the Federal Rules generally favor admissibility

of the story by deciding what questions to ask. These questions rarely
allow the witness to explain things the way she would like and often
fail to tell the jurors what they want to know. After the witness
responds to one lawyer‘s questions, the other lawyer typically attacks
her answers and sometimes even her character.
Id.
ROBERTO ARON & JONATHAN L. ROSNER, HOW TO PREPARE WITNESSES FOR TRIAL 4
(1985). The legal profession perpetuates the notion that trials are only used to determine
the truth. Id. As a result, people often believe that the witnesses one calls share facts
favorable to that party. Id.; see also LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 2. Trials give
―parties the opportunity to present opposing views and opinions, maintaining peace and
social order by providing a formal setting in which to engage in conflict, resolving those
conflicts, achieving ‗justice,‘ and testing the viability and scope of specific rules of law.‖
LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 2.
19
FED. R. EVID. 401. Rule 401 states that ―‗[r]elevant evidence‘ means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.‖ Id.;
see also FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing reasons why relevant evidence may not be admissible);
FED. R. EVID. 403 (balancing probative values against the dangers of misleading the jury,
unfair prejudice, or waste of time, and further stating that relevant evidence may not be
admissible).
20
FED. R. EVID. 401; see also EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 544 (3d ed.
1984) (proposing that relevant evidence is evidence that advances the inquiry into the legal
dispute). See generally Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature
of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 499–510 (1983) (discussing the history
of Rule 403 and analyzing the rule).
21
FED. R. EVID. 403. Relevant evidence can be excluded to avoid confusion, waste of
time, or prejudice. Id.; see also GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 33–40 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LILLY INTRODUCTION] (stating that relevant
evidence can be inadmissible because of unfair prejudice, constitutional provisions, and
statutory enactments). See generally United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 611, 618–19 (2d Cir.
1976) (holding that evidence of the accused possessing a gun when arrested for a bank
robbery was unfairly prejudicial because the jury would likely view the accused as a
dangerous person that should be in jail).
18

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 [2010], Art. 7

162

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

of evidence.22 For the most part, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern
whether evidence is admissible during a trial.23
On January 2, 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence
to govern the admissibility of evidence and to regulate how to present
evidence to the trier of fact.24 The purpose of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is to secure fairness, conserve judicial resources, and prevent
unnecessary waste.25 The Federal Rules of Evidence encourage judges to
use their discretion to promote the growth and development of evidence
law.26 The rules only apply to proceedings before courts of the United
States, United States bankruptcy judges, and United States magistrate
judges.27 However, after Congress enacted the rules, over forty states

22
See Beech Air Craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (stating that the Federal
Rules of Evidence contain a liberal thrust towards admissibility); see also FED. R. EVID. 401–
403 (defining relevance broadly); LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 6 (discussing the
theory that the more evidence is admitted, the more likely the goals of the Federal Rules of
Evidence will be satisfied).
23
See LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 3 (―[T]he adversary system and the rules of
evidence are the mechanisms we use to strike the complex balance between truth and the
competing goals of the trial process.‖). Attorneys often employ trial tactics and strategies
to prevent the truth from coming out during trial, and the rules of evidence often prevent
attorney‘s from doing so. Id. Additionally, ―federal evidence law requires a great deal of
interpretation, and many rules explicitly call upon the trial judge to exercise discretion.‖ Id.
at 6.
24
Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 3, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (enacting the rules). Before Congress
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, ―all evidence rules were a product of common law.‖
LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 5. For the most part, the Federal Rules of Evidence
adopted the existing common law. Id. at 6. The common law rules of evidence contained
more strict exclusionary rules and conventions than the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. The
Federal Rules take a relaxed approach and give the trial judge a great deal of responsibility.
Id. There were four other attempts to codify evidence law before Congress enacted the
Federal Rules of Evidence. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER
THE RULES 4 (3d ed. 2009).
25
FED. R. EVID. 102. Rule 102 reads:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
Id.; see also GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 1–2 (2006) [hereinafter LILLY
EVIDENCE] (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence controls what information the jury
hears, expedites the trial, improves the quality of evidence introduced, and maintains a fair
balance during trials).
26
FED. R. EVID. 102; see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (giving the judge the responsibility of
deciding preliminary questions of fact to determine if evidence is admissible). See generally
DANIEL A. GRIFFITH, A VIEW FROM THEIR BENCH: EVIDENCE AND EXPERT TESTIMONY BEST
PRACTICES 8 (2008) (suggesting that judges are gatekeepers who must ensure that evidence
presented during a trial is trustworthy).
27
FED. R. EVID. 101; see also FED. R. EVID. 1101 (giving the extent to which the Federal
Rules of Evidence apply and exceptions to the rules).
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adopted similar evidence rules to use in state courts. 28 Only a few states,
such as Illinois, Massachusetts, and California, have not adopted a
version of the federal rules.29
B. Hearsay Rule―Federal Rule of Evidence 801
In the states that have adopted a version of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, one of the most well-known, frustrating, and convoluted
evidence rules is the hearsay rule. 30 According to Rule 801, the hearsay
rule defines as hearsay any ―statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.‖31 The general understanding is
that hearsay occurs when a witness repeats information that he obtained
from a second-hand source.32 Not every statement by an out-of-court

LILLY EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 2. Before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the majority of evidence law came from state and federal judicial decision. Id.
As more states adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence law became code-based
and American courts experienced greater uniformity. Id.
29
MUELLER ET AL., supra note 24, at 4 n.2. As of 2009, forty-two states adopted evidence
codes modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. Even in the states that have not
adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, appellate decisions frequently cite them while
adopting the underlying principles behind the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 4.
30
LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 135. ―No evidence rule is as vexing to law
students as the hearsay rule.‖ Id.; see also Roger C. Park, McCormick on Evidence and the
Concept of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed by Suggestions to Law Teachers, 65 MINN. L.
REV. 423, 424 (1981) (suggesting that students may favor the simplification of the hearsay
rules that scholars advocate for when they become lawyers). See generally 5 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 9 (3d ed. 1940) (stating that the idea of the hearsay rule
developed in the 1500s, but the rule did not become completely developed until the early
1700s).
31
FED. R. EVID. 801; see also IRVING YOUNGER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE 145–46 (3d
ed. 1997) (discussing that the hearsay rule is extremely complex and scholars differ on how
to define hearsay and even more so on how the hearsay rule should apply); Olin Guy
Wellborn III, The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEX. L. REV. 49, 50–
91 (1982) (breaking down the hearsay rule and explaining the rule in-depth); Carl C.
Wheaton, What Is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 210, 210–11 (1961) (stating that there generally
is not one accepted definition of hearsay and giving several evidence law scholars‘
definition of hearsay).
32
LILLY INTRODUCTION, supra note 21, at 180. For an in-depth analysis on the reasoning
and theory of the hearsay rule, see generally Craig R. Callen, Hearsay and Informal
Reasoning, 47 VAND. L. REV. 43, 73–100 (1994); Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial
Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 727–50 (1992); Roger C.
Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 54–88 (1987); Eleanor
Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1339, 1341–90 (1987); Glen
Weissenberger, Reconstructing the Definition of Hearsay, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1525, 1527–42 (1996).
28
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declarant is hearsay.33 The proponent of the statement must also offer
the statement to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 34
The purpose behind the hearsay rule is to ensure the accuracy of
statements made out-of-court and to allow cross-examination of
witnesses.35 The Anglo-American tradition had three conditions that
had to be met for witnesses to testify: (1) presence at trial, (2) crossexamination, and (3) an oath or affirmation.36 The hearsay rule ensures
compliance with these three conditions, and if one is missing, the
statement is likely inadmissible because of its inherent unreliability. 37
FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see also ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW: A STUDENT‘S GUIDE
LAW OF EVIDENCE AS APPLIED IN AMERICAN TRIALS 241 (1998) (illustrating that an
out-of-court statement is not hearsay when the trier of fact does not need to rely on the
credibility of the declarant.) For example, if the out-of-court statement ―Help me!‖ is
offered to prove the declarant was alive when he uttered the statement, the jury does not
have to rely on the declarant‘s credibility because the statement is useful simply by the fact
the declarant made the statement, not by the content or truthfulness of the statement. PARK
ET AL., supra note 33, at 241–42.
34
FED. R. EVID. 801(c); see also United States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 925–26 (9th
Cir. 2006) (finding that school documents were hearsay in an abuse trial to show the victim
had behavioral problems); United States v. Sadler, 234 F.3d 368, 372 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding
that the defendant‘s protest of innocence was hearsay if the defendant offered it to prove
he ―was in fact innocent‖).
35
Wheaton, supra note 31, at 219–22. The reasons for the adoption of the hearsay rule
include lack of opportunity to cross-examine, inability to observe demeanor evidence, and
the lack of trust in the jury. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN‘S
EVIDENCE MANUAL STUDENT EDITION §§ 17.02[2]–.03[3] (6th ed. 2003). Without crossexamination, the trier of fact cannot observe testimonial infirmities and determine the
credibility of a speaker. MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT 81 (1989). Hearsay is inadmissible because the
declarant‘s statement is not subject to cross-examination, and the jury cannot assess the
declarant‘s demeanor and credibility. See, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 292–
94 (1973); State v. McVay, 622 P.2d 9, 12 (Ariz. 1980); State v. Freber, 366 So. 2d 426, 427–28
(Fla. 1978); Kelly v. State, 694 P.2d 126, 129–30 (Wyo. 1985); see also State v. Murray, 174
P.3d 407, 428 (Kan. 2008) (stating that when statements are offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement, the credibility of the declarant provides the basis for the
inference). Thus, the declarant has to be available for cross-examination. Murray, 174 P.3d
at 428.
36
GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY 400–01 (1999). At common law, the system excluded most
evidence that failed to satisfy these three conditions. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154
(1970); see also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee‘s notes (suggesting that all
hearsay lacks presence at trial and the court cannot evaluate the declarant‘s demeanor). See
generally Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974) (―The primary justification for
the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-examine
the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is introduced into evidence.‖).
37
WEISSENBERGER, supra note 36, at 401; see also Michael H. Graham, “Stickperson
Hearsay”: A Simplified Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 887, 888 (―When the statement is hearsay, the trier of fact is not in a position to assess
the proper weight to be accorded the out-of-court statement . . . .‖); I. Daniel Stewart, Jr.,
Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of
33

TO THE
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The hearsay rule preserves the ability to evaluate a witness‘s perception,
memory, narration, and sincerity.38 When hearsay evidence is offered,
the hearsay witness does not have any knowledge of the event the outof-court declarant‘s statement concerns; therefore, the court can only
explore the hearsay witness‘s demeanor and memory to determine
whether the witness correctly heard the out-of-court declarant‘s
statement.39 Thus, when the court does not have any way to examine the
reliability of the statement, the court considers the statement as
hearsay.40
On the other hand, the hearsay rule is extremely broad and it can
make valuable evidence inadmissible. 41 As a consequence of this
predicament, Congress created numerous exceptions to the rule in order
to make hearsay admissible under situations that supply guarantees of
trustworthiness.42 Many criticize this approach, arguing the rule is too
complex, prevents the growth of evidence law, and does not differentiate

Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 22 (stating that cross-examination allows the court to test the
accuracy of the witness‘s memory, perception, and communication).
38
PAUL R. RICE, BEST-KEPT SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAW: 101 PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND
PITFALLS 47 (2001). See generally 4 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL 209–10 (7th ed. 2000) (discussing the benefits of preserving the ability to evaluate
a declarant‘s perception, narration, sincerity, and memory); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative
Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REV. 331, 331–46 (1961) (discussing the hearsay rule and the
uses of the rule).
39
PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES: 150 THINGS YOU WERE NEVER
TAUGHT, FORGOT, OR NEVER UNDERSTOOD 55 (2006). Hearsay testimony involves two
truths: the fact that certain words were spoken and the substance of what the spoken
words describe. Id. In addition, the original declarant‘s untested memory, sincerity,
ambiguity, and perception give rise to the hearsay rule. Id. See generally Christopher B.
Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 367,
391 (1992) (arguing that cross-examining a witness cannot make statements reliable, but
rather cross-examination provides the opponent with an opportunity to test and challenge
their stories so the trier of fact can evaluate them).
40
PAUL R. RICE & ROY A KATRIEL, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 283 (2005); see also Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20, 21–22 (1976) (reversing a
conviction for possession of heroin because the court considered the informant‘s statement
that the defendant owned the apartment as hearsay, and the police did not have any other
evidence that the defendant owned the apartment).
41
See LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 180 (arguing the hearsay rule makes some
evidence inadmissible that is reliable and is useful for resolving disputes); WEISSENBERGER,
supra note 36, at 401 (stating that the hearsay rule excludes a lot of relevant evidence
because the evidence is inherently untrustworthy).
42
LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 5. The hearsay rule is too broad, and the rule
makes some evidence inadmissible that is quite reliable. Id. at 180. A lot of hearsay is too
useful and important to do without. Id. As a result, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain
roughly thirty exceptions and eight exemptions to the hearsay rule. Id. Almost all of the
states have adopted the hearsay exemptions and exceptions. Id.
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between good and bad hearsay.43 The only alternatives to the hearsay
rule are to abolish the rule altogether and admit all hearsay, admit the
hearsay with procedural safeguards if the hearsay has great probative
value, or adjust the current exceptions. 44 In any event, the hearsay rule
will never be flawless, and the courts must use the hearsay rule and all of
the exceptions to the best of their ability to ensure fairness and to
promote the growth of evidence law.45
1.

Former Testimony Exception―Rule 804(b)(1)

One of the numerous exceptions that courts must use to ensure
fairness and promote the growth of evidence law is the former testimony
exception.46 In order for the former testimony exception to apply, the
See, e.g., Park, supra note 32, at 122 (discussing the hearsay rule and arguing that the
currently existing structures against hearsay in criminal cases should not change). In civil
cases, however, the hearsay rule should be liberalized to permit the court to consider
additional evidence. Id. See generally Perry Wadsworth, Jr., Constitutional Admissibility of
Hearsay under the Confrontation Clause: Reliability Requirement for Hearsay Admitted under a
Non-“Firmly Rooted” Exception—Idaho v. Wright, 14 CAMPBELL L. REV. 347, 359 (1992)
(arguing that in many cases, what a hearsay declarant says on cross-examination will not
likely have a persuasive impact on the jury).
44
FED. R. EVID. ART. VIII advisory committee‘s note; ANDREW L.-T. CHOO, HEARSAY AND
CONFRONTATION IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 163–93 (1996); see also Park, supra note 32, at 122
(analyzing and discussing possible changes to the hearsay rule and concluding that further
liberalization of the hearsay rule in civil cases is appropriate).
45
See supra note 25 and accompanying text (stating that Rule 102 suggests judges should
interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence to promote fairness, eliminate unjustifiable delay
and expense, and to promote the growth of evidence law to determine the truth so
proceedings can be justly determined).
46
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). The difference between a hearsay exception and exemption is
that a hearsay exception is hearsay, but each exception to the hearsay rule has a feature that
reduces the danger of admitting the hearsay. LILLY EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 193–268.
On the other hand, statements that fit under a hearsay exemption are not hearsay according
to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 166–92; see supra note 9 (providing the text of Rule
804(b)(1)); see also, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 (containing twenty-four exceptions to the hearsay
rule that apply regardless of whether the declarant is available). Rule 804 contains a total
of six exceptions to the hearsay rule that apply when a declarant is unavailable. FED. R.
EVID. 804. Furthermore, Rule 807, the residual exception, applies to hearsay not covered
under Rule 803 or 804 that has guarantees of trustworthiness when the court determines
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement
into evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 807. See generally LILLY EVIDENCE, supra note 25, at 248–56 (providing a
discussion of the former testimony exception and illustrations of how the former testimony
exception applies). The ability to admit hearsay testimony under Rule 804(b)(1) is similar
to Rule 32(a)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows an adverse party to
43
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declarant must be unavailable.47 Under Rule 804(b)(1), prior testimony is
admissible so long as the ―party against whom the testimony is now
offered . . . had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
Offering
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.‖ 48
use a deposition taken by the party‘s officer, managing agent, or director for any purpose.
FED. R. CIV. P. 32(a)(3).
47
FED. R. EVID. 804. Rule 804(a) reads:
(a) Definition of unavailability. ―Unavailability as a witness‖
includes situations in which the declarant-(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege
from testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant‘s
statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of
the declarant‘s statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the
declarant‘s statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of
death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement
has been unable to
procure the declarant‘s attendance (or in the case of a hearsay
exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant‘s
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal,
claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the
procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the
purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
Id. For a discussion of unavailability, see 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence §§ 695–703 (2008);
WEISSENBERGER, supra note 36, at 556–64. See generally Jack R. Jelsema et al., Hearsay Under
the Proposed Federal Rules: A Discretionary Approach, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1077, 1101–05 (1969)
(discussing the different situations that meet the unavailability requirement). Rule
804(b)(1) is not meant to bind a party to a position taken previously, such as collateral
estoppel or res judicata. Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible
Hearsay from an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1079, 1101 (1987). Courts use Rule
804(b)(1) to preserve testimony from a person no longer available. Id.
48
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). The determination of whether former testimony is admissible
is determined by the judge under Rule 104(a). FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Rule 104(a) reads:
(a) Questions of Admissibility Generally. Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges.
Id. The similar motive requirement makes a comparison between an examiner‘s motive at
the prior proceeding to what his motive would be at the current proceeding. United States
v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1992). The Federal Rules of Evidence are
interpreted using a plain meaning approach. See, e.g., Edward R. Becker & Aviva
Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning”
Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for
Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 864–68 (1992) (addressing how
courts use the plain meaning to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence); Edward Cleary,
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testimony from a previous proceeding presents a hearsay problem
because the declarant of the statement is not present at trial. 49 Therefore,
the jury cannot observe the witness‘s demeanor, and the statement is
hearsay.50
2.

Opportunity and Similar Motive

Even though the jury cannot observe the witness‘s demeanor, the
former testimony exception is justified by policies of trustworthiness and
necessity.51 Former testimony is trustworthy because at the previous
proceeding, the declarant appeared under oath for examination and
cross-examination.52 It is highly likely that a witness‘s prior testimony is
Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 911–19 (1978)
(discussing the plain meaning rule and how the rule relates to the Federal Rules of
Evidence). See generally Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485–86 (1917) (applying
the plain meaning rule and ignoring the purpose of a statute). Similar motive is not
defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence, so the plain meaning applies, unless the plain
meaning leads to an unconstitutional result. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504, 510 (1989). The dictionary defines ―similar‖ as ―having characteristics in common,‖
―comparable,‖ and ―very much alike.‖ WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2120 (2002). However, ―similar‖ does not mean identical. Murray v. Toyota Motor Distrib.
Inc., 664 F.2d 1377, 1379 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, ―motive‖ is defined as ―something
within a person that incites him to action.‖ WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1475 (2002) (parenthetical omitted).
49
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee‘s note. The witness previously appeared
under oath and was subjected to cross-examination; therefore, under the former testimony
exception, the only ideal condition missing is demeanor evidence from the declarant
appearing at trial. Id. Former testimony is arguably the most reliable hearsay. Id.
50
RICE & KATRIEL, supra note 40, at 391. Former testimony is considered to be especially
reliable hearsay. Id. The only problem with former testimony is the inability to observe the
demeanor of the witness. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986)
(holding that the former testimony exception is unlike other hearsay exceptions and is
simply a weak substitute for live testimony); 2 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 308 (6th ed. 2006). See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902 (1983)
(stating that the purpose of the jury is to decipher between true and false testimony, no
matter how important the matter is); James H. Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule—A
Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 947
(1962) (arguing that the purpose of the jury is to make credibility determinations); Toni M.
Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and
Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 512–13 (1986) (discussing the importance juries serve and
that juries protect citizens from abuses of power by the government).
51
4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 487 (1977).
See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (discussing the importance of
allowing the jury to make decisions to protect the defendant from corruption, overzealous
prosecutors, and potentially biased judges); Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836, 840–41 (Fla.
1984) (suggesting that the American society places an extreme importance on the right to be
judged by peers).
52
WEISSENBERGER, supra note 36, at 567; see FISHMAN, supra note 38, at 209 (arguing that
to some people taking an oath causes them to testify honestly out of fear of being charged
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accurate and reliable when the declarant testifies under the penalty of
perjury.53
Furthermore, Rule 804(b)(1) is based upon the idea that a party who
previously had an opportunity and motive to develop testimony should
not be able to exclude the testimony because of the decision not to crossexamine or to cross-examine lightly.54 The opportunity and similar
motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) ensures that the party against whom
testimony is being offered had a meaningful opportunity to sufficiently
examine the witness and expose possible flaws in the testimony. 55
Moreover, as long as the motivation to examine a witness is substantially
the same, a change of courts or argument will not render the former
testimony inadmissible.56 Rule 804(b)(1), however, does not apply when

with perjury and that cross-examination shows potential biases, weaknesses, and
ambiguities in the witness‘s testimony).
53
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70 (1980) (allowing witness testimony because the
court thought the witness participated in the functional equivalent of cross-examination);
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (finding testimony from a previous trial
admissible because the respondent had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, and the
testimony formed the basis for the murder conviction).
54
GRAHAM, supra note 35, at 277. A tactical decision not to cross-examine a witness or to
cross-examine lightly does not affect the adequacy of opportunity. Id.; see also California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (holding that a witness‘s testimony is admissible when the
testimony is given under circumstances closely resembling trial and the respondent had the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness about his testimony).
55
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive requirement ―reflects narrow
concerns of ensuring the reliability of evidence admitted at trial.‖ United States v. Salerno
(Salerno III), 505 U.S. 317, 326 (1992). Meaningful opportunity does not necessarily mean
the party had to take advantage of the opportunity. Id. at 329–30. A party that examines a
witness lightly risks the chance that the witness will become unavailable for trial, making
the testimony from the examination admissible. GRAHAM, supra note 35, at 277–78; see, e.g.,
United States v. Geiger, 263 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district
court properly admitted former testimony when the defendant possessed a similar motive
to develop the witness‘s testimony and any failure to cross-examine the witness resulted
not from a lack of opportunity but from defendant‘s ineffective use of that opportunity); In
re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (holding that making a
party suffer the consequences for foregoing cross-examination is fair).
56
GRAHAM, supra note 35, at 275; see, e.g., DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222,
226–27 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding opportunity and similar motive satisfied when the plaintiff‘s
counsel asked only one question to the doctor during a worker‘s compensation case). The
plaintiff argued the cross-examination was limited because the only issue was whether the
plaintiff‘s painkiller problem related to an injury on the job. DeLuryea, 697 F.2d at 226. The
plaintiff argued the cross-examination was not meaningful in the context of the following
products liability case. Id. The Eighth Circuit did not agree and held the doctor‘s
testimony related to the same issue in both cases—proving the allegations of misconduct
wrong. Id. at 226–27.; cf. United States v. Lanci, 669 F.2d 391, 394–95 (6th Cir. 1982)
(denying the defendant‘s request to admit testimony previously given during a state
criminal trial because the state did not have a similar motive to expose the facts
surrounding the bribery of an FBI agent).
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the motive of the party against whom the evidence is offered has
substantially changed because of a cause of action change, added parties
and issues, or an intervening indictment.57
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not define similar motive, but Rule
804(b)(1) only requires a similar motive, not an identical one. 58 The rule
is meant to salvage the testimony of a witness for its apparent worth. 59
The opportunity and similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) can be
problematic when tactical considerations are taken into account during
prior testimony.60 The party examining a witness may not want to show

57
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 35, at § 17.02[2]; see also, e.g., United States v. JacksonRandolph, 282 F.3d 369, 381–82 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding testimony at state agency hearing
inadmissible during a criminal prosecution because the issues and motivations were
substantially different); United States v. McDonald, 837 F.2d 1287, 1292–93 (5th Cir. 1988)
(holding former testimony inadmissible when the defendant attempted to introduce a
deposition taken by an insurance company because the government knew that the
deponent would refuse to testify during trial; therefore, the testimony likely contained
inaccuracies).
58
FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee‘s note. To determine whether a similar motive
exists, courts should first look at the examination that occurred during the prior proceeding
and determine whether the party would conduct a similar examination now if given the
chance. United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1992). If that is not
conclusive, the courts should ask ―whether a reasonable examiner under the circumstances
would have had a similar motive to examine the witness.‖ Id.; see also, e.g., United States v.
Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 188 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that Rule 804(b)(1) requires a party to
have a similar but not necessarily an identical motive to develop testimony); Supermarket
of Marlinton v. Meadow Gold Dairies, 71 F.3d 119, 127 (4th Cir. 1995) (requiring a similar
motive not a more stringent identical motive); United States v. Doyle, 621 F. Supp. 2d 337,
344 (W.D. Va. 2009) (holding that the defendant possessed a similar motive during a bond
hearing as he would at trial).
59
WEISSENBERGER, supra note 36, at 573; see also FISHMAN, supra note 38, at 501–33
(providing a thorough discussion of the former testimony exception and why the rule is
helpful). See generally David Robinson, Jr., From Fat Tony and Mat Ty the Horse to the Sad
Case of A.T.: Defensive and Offensive Use of Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Cases, 32 HOUS. L.
REV. 895, 904–13 (1995) (discussing the former testimony exception and how courts apply
the rule).
60
See BROUN ET AL., supra note 9, § 304 (stating that the circuit courts appear to be in
disagreement over whether exculpatory grand jury testimony meets Rule 804(b)(1)‘s
similar motive requirement) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
Taplin, 954 F.2d 1256, 1259 (6th Cir. 1992) (assessing similar motive requires the court to
look at whether the two proceedings reflect a substantial identity of issues); Zenith Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (giving factors to use to
assess similar motive: ―(1) the type of proceeding in which the testimony is given, (2) trial
strategy, (3) the potential penalties or financial stakes, and (4) the number of issues and
parties.‖) (footnotes omitted). Critics argue that if a witness offers incriminating evidence
against a defendant during a grand jury proceeding, the government grants him immunity
and allows him to testify at trial. United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 505 U.S. 317, 324
(1992). Conversely, if a witness gives testimony exonerating the defendant, the
government does not grant him immunity and excludes the evidence as hearsay. Id. See
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his plans for trial or the prosecutor may just want to show enough
evidence to secure an indictment, which is why Judith M. Mercier
suggested courts adopt a ―reasonable examiner‖ approach to determine
whether a similar motive existed.61 Depending on the circumstances,
lawyers taking testimony at a proceeding before trial may have different
motivations and concerns that they would not have if they could
examine the witness during trial. 62 Because of the differences in
motivation to cross-examine a witness during a grand jury proceeding
and during trial, there is a split within the circuit courts on how to
interpret Rule 804(b)(1).63

generally FED. R. EVID. 806 (allowing the government to impeach the declarant of a hearsay
statement at trial if the court admits hearsay testimony).
61
See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 522–24 (1st Cir. 1997). During the grand jury
proceeding, the government does not seek to discredit the witness. Id. at 523. The
government may want to establish evidence for part of an ongoing investigation. Id.
Moreover, discrediting a grand jury witness is hardly necessary because of the lower
burden of proof and the government‘s ability to call its own witnesses. Id.; see also Judith
M. Mercier, United States v. Salerno: An Examination of Rule 804(b)(1), 48 U. MIAMI L. REV.
323, 342 (1993) (suggesting that the courts should adopt a reasonable examiner approach to
Rule 804(b)(1), in which a court evaluates whether a reasonable examiner in the situation
would have possessed a similar motive to examine the witness).
62
See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 894 F.2d 895, 90102 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
the government did not have a similar motive during the witness‘s guilty plea hearing
because the government‘s motive in examining is to ensure that the plea is voluntary,
which is not the same as at a trial); cf. United States v. Poland, 659 F.2d 884, 896 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding identification testimony during a previous hearing admissible after the
identification witness died because the defendant had the same motive during the hearing
as he would have at trial). See generally SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART,
FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 186–233 (1996) (discussing the
history of the grand jury system and examining the importance of maintaining the secrecy
of grand jury proceedings); MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN
INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 23–24 (1977) (arguing that the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is
important to protect those accused of a crime that may be innocent and to encourage
witnesses to come forward and testify truthfully).
63
See, e.g., Valerie A. DePalma, Evidence: United States v. DiNapoli: Admission of
Exculpatory Grand Jury Testimony Against the Government Under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(1), 61 BROOK. L. REV. 543, 546–77 (1995) (analyzing the United States v. DiNapoli
decision and former testimony exception); Randolph N. Jonakait, Text, Texts, or Ad Hoc
Determinations: Interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 71 IND. L.J. 551, 591 (1996)
(arguing that the interpretation of the evidence rules should be text centered); Randolph N.
Jonakait, The Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circumstantial
Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 431, 441–42
(1986) (discussing grand jury testimony as former testimony); Lizbeth A. Turner, Admission
of Grand Jury Testimony Under the Residual Hearsay Exception, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1033, 1070
(1985) (arguing that courts should not exclude admission of all grand jury testimony of an
unavailable witness, and routinely admitting former testimony would undermine the
defendant‘s ability to confront witnesses); Glen Weissenberger, The Former Testimony
Hearsay Exception: A Study in Rulemaking, Judicial Revisionism, and the Separation of Powers, 67
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Broad Interpretation of “Similar Motive”

On one side of the split, some federal courts use a broad
interpretation of the similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) to find that
the government has the same motive to develop a witness‘s testimony
during a grand jury proceeding as it does at trial. 64 For example, in
United States v. Miller, the defendants attempted to call a defense witness
who testified before the grand jury, but the witness asserted his Fifth
Amendment right not to testify.65 Next, the defendants attempted to
have the testimony admitted under Rule 804(b)(1), but the trial court
determined the government did not have a similar motive during the
trial as it did during the grand jury proceeding.66 After the court denied
the use of the exculpatory grand jury testimony, the jury convicted both
of the defendants.67
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court wrongly
excluded the evidence because the government had a similar motive to
question the defense witness during the grand jury proceeding and at
trial.68 The government had a similar motive because in both situations
N.C. L. REV. 295, 335–36 (1989) (suggesting that the Supreme Court should address how to
interpret Rule 804(b)(1)).
64
See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 443–45 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that the
testimony from a 1966 preliminary hearing was admissible under 804(b)(1) in a 2003
prosecution for the same offense because the defendant‘s motive was always to discredit a
witness providing testimony to convict him); Battle v. Mem‘l Hosp., 228 F.3d 544, 552–53
(5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the defendants possessed a similar motive to question the
plaintiffs‘ witness during a deposition and at trial because the defendants had the same
interest to prove the witness‘s testimony to be inaccurate, even though the defendants
argued that their motive during the deposition was only to understand plaintiffs‘ case). See
generally Glen Weissenberger, The Admissibility of Grand Jury Transcripts: Avoiding the
Constitutional Issue, 59 TUL. L. REV. 335, 344–49 (1984) (discussing the intended use of Rule
804(b)(1)) [hereinafter Weissenberger, Transcripts].
65
904 F.2d 65, 66–68 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The court found Matazarro‘s unavailability
undeniable so long as Matazarro could properly assert his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at
68; see also United States v. Young Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 690 (5th Cir. 1984); In re
Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 661 F.2d 1145, 1158 (7th Cir. 1981) (discussing
when a witness is unavailable). See generally R. H. HELMHOLZ ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1997) (providing the history of the Fifth Amendment‘s right
against self-incrimination).
66
Miller, 904 F.2d at 66–68.
67
Id. The jury convicted Miller and Ross for wire fraud and aiding and abetting wire
fraud. Id. at 65.
68
Id. at 68; see also, e.g., United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting
that the trial judge erroneously excluded grand jury testimony because the government
had a prior opportunity to question the witness during the grand jury proceeding); Young
Bros., Inc., 728 F.2d at 691 (stating that the concern for adversarial fairness in Rule 804(b)(1)
is not in controversy when the government had the opportunity to question the witness
during the grand jury proceeding); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516–17 (4th Cir.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss1/7

Horvath: No More Splitting: Using a Factual Inquiry to Determine Similar

2010]

Similar Motive and Rule 804(b)(1)

173

the prosecutor focused on the same issue—whether the defendants were
guilty or innocent.69 Thus, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Rule 804(b)(1)
broadly by only examining whether the government focused on
extracting incriminating testimony during the two proceedings and
admitting the testimony.70
Similarly, in United States v. Foster, the Drug Enforcement Agency
conducted an investigation on suspected drug dealers.71 A witness later
testified three times in front of a grand jury that the defendant did not
sell drugs.72 The grand jury eventually indicted the defendant, and
during the trial, the defendant tried to admit the witness‘s grand jury
1979) (holding the government had a similar motive and opportunity to question witnesses
before a grand jury as it would have during trial).
69
Miller, 904 F.2d at 68. The D.C. Circuit also noted that the grand jury testimony
largely corroborated the appellants‘ testimony, and the testimony could have influenced
the jury and resulted in an acquittal for the defendants. Id. Thus, the district court abused
its discretion by excluding the testimony. Id.; see also Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97
(1979) (holding that the defendant‘s right to due process required the admission of the
statement of a co-defendant that the prosecution sought to exclude as hearsay); Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (holding that due process requires that the accused
in a criminal trial has the right to a fair opportunity to defend and present his case, and that
the defendant‘s right to call witnesses to support his case is essential to due process);
Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 411–12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the district
court violated the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by excluding
the transcript of an unavailable witness‘s grand jury testimony).
70
Miller, 904 F.2d at 68; see also United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 379–80 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (holding that the district courts should apply a fact-specific inquiry to examine
whether prosecutors have a similar motive to develop testimony at a grand jury proceeding
as they would during trial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
the government did not have similar motive to develop testimony during the trial as it did
during the grand jury proceeding).
71
128 F.3d 949, 951–52 (6th Cir. 1997). The Drug Enforcement Administration (―DEA‖)
investigated Reda Ghazaleh and Osama Shalash for dealing drugs. Id. at 950. The DEA
discovered Foster did business with Ghazaleh and Shalash after observing Foster receive a
package from Shalash. Id. The government eventually indicted Shalash, and he claimed he
sold Foster cocaine six times. Id. Subsequently, the police executed a search warrant on
Timothy Williams, another suspected drug dealer. Id. at 950–51. During the search, the
police discovered cocaine, guns, large amounts of cash, and Foster was present carrying
over $3000. Id. at 951. The police executed another search warrant at Foster‘s home. Id.
The search revealed documents showing Foster, whose only source of documented income
was a small amount that he earned while working at a Marriott Hotel as a houseman, made
several large purchases. Id. Foster purchased everything with cash, and Foster did not file
an income tax return in 1993 and 1994. Id. In 1993, Foster purchased a 1986 Mercedes for
$13,500, a 1989 BMW for $23,263, and a 1987 Ford for $2650. Id. The following year Foster
purchased a 1985 Cadillac for $14,207, a 1987 Ford Bronco for $5000, a house lease for
$6500, furniture for $1039, and car insurance for $1793. Id. Foster also had $2402 in a
savings account. Id.
72
Id. Williams testified before the grand jury three times that Foster did not sell drugs
and that Foster would not have been at Williams‘s home if he knew Williams sold drugs.
Id. Williams stated that on the day the DEA searched his home, Foster just stopped by. Id.
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testimony under Rule 804(b)(1), but the court found the testimony
inadmissible.73 The defendant appealed, arguing the government had
the same motive during the grand jury proceeding as it did at trial. 74 The
Sixth Circuit held the government had a similar motive and opportunity
to develop Williams‘ testimony before the grand jury as at trial. 75 During
both proceedings, the government‘s motive was to develop
incriminating testimony to prove the defendant‘s guilt; therefore, the
government had a similar motive under Rule 804(b)(1).76 Thus, in Foster,
the Sixth Circuit adopted a broad interpretation of the similar motive
element of Rule 804(b)(1).77
Most recently, in United States v. McFall, McFall and three others
were prosecuted for attempted extortion, witness tampering, conspiracy
to commit extortion, and honest services mail fraud. 78 Before the trial,
the other three defendants accepted plea agreements and agreed to
cooperate with the government; however, the prosecutor never called
upon the defendants to testify at trial.79 McFall attempted to call on the
defendants to testify during the trial, but each invoked his Fifth
Id. at 95152.
Id. at 955.
75
Id. at 955–56. The Sixth Circuit stated that the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit
courts all rule that the government has a similar motive to develop a witness‘s testimony at
trial as it does during a grand jury proceeding. Id. at 955; see United States v. Lester, 749
F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding the government had the same motive at trial as it
did during the grand jury proceeding); United States v. Young Bros, Inc., 728 F.2d 682, 691
(5th Cir. 1984) (discussing that the concern for adversarial fairness in Rule 804(b)(1) is not
present when the government already had an opportunity to examine a witness during a
grand jury proceeding); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516–17 (4th Cir. 1979)
(stating that when a prosecutor has an opportunity to question a witness during a grand
jury proceeding, Rule 804(b)(1) applies, and the testimony is admissible).
76
Foster, 128 F.3d at 956. Foster faced a substantial sentence if convicted, and the court
wrongly excluded the grand jury testimony from the jurors. Id. The grand jury testimony
might not have led to an acquittal, but the testimony benefited Foster. Id. Additionally, the
government only had circumstantial evidence, and the defendant should have been able to
present the witness‘s testimony denying the defendant dealt drugs. Id.; see also Kotteakos
v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) (―[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that
the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that
substantial rights were not affected.‖).
77
Foster, 128 F.3d at 95657. But see United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 379–80 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (finding that district courts should apply a fact-specific inquiry to determine
whether the government has a similar motive to develop the testimony during a grand jury
proceeding as it does at trial). The trial court made a sufficient inquiry and did not abuse
its discretion by finding that the government‘s motive to develop testimony was not the
same in front of the grand jury as it was during trial. Id.
78
558 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2009). The prosecution alleged that the defendants used the
County Supervisor to promote private economic interests. Id. at 953–54.
79
Id. at 954.
73
74
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Amendment right not to testify.80 The government later called a new
witness who gave testimony incriminating McFall. 81 McFall attempted
to use Rule 804(b)(1) to admit the other defendant‘s grand jury
testimony, which referred to the testimony of the government‘s witness
as ―ridiculous,‖ but the district court held the testimony was
inadmissible hearsay.82
McFall appealed and argued that the district court wrongly excluded
the grand jury testimony.83 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the D.C. and
Sixth Circuit‘s interpretation of similar motive and found that the district
court wrongly excluded the evidence because Rule 804(b)(1) does not
require an identical quantum of motivation. 84 The government‘s
purpose of questioning Sawyer before the grand jury was to extract
testimony that the defendants conspired to commit extortion—the same
motive the government possessed at trial. 85 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
adopted a broad interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1).86
b.

Narrow Interpretation of “Similar Motive”

Alternatively, some federal courts have a narrow interpretation of
the similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) and often find that a
prosecutor‘s motives are not substantially similar because prosecutors do
not have any interest in showing a witness‘s testimony to be false before

Id.
Id. The government called Levy, a lobbyist, to testify, and Levy stated that ―Sawyer
made extortionate threats on McFall‘s behalf during a telephone conversation to which
Levy and Sawyer were the only parties.‖ Id. at 961.
82
Id. The court also noted that the government did not need to take advantage of all
opportunities to examine Sawyer in front of the grand jury. Id. Rule 804(b)(1) only
requires that the prosecution had the motive to do so. Id.; see United States v. Geiger, 263
F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (―Any failure to cross-examine Churchill resulted not from
lack of opportunity but from the defense attorney‘s utilization of that opportunity.‖); see
also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (―[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees
an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.‖); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 73 n.12 (1980) (discussing that if the defense‘s only chance to cross-examine a witness is
at a preliminary hearing, there does not need to be an examination of effectiveness, unless
an extraordinary case exists where the defense counsel did not provide adequate
representation at the prior proceeding). See generally FISHMAN, supra note 38, at 290–303
(discussing the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment).
83
McFall, 558 F.3d at 960.
84
Id. at 963. The government‘s purpose in the grand jury proceeding and its purpose at
trial were the same―drawing out testimony to secure a conviction against McFall for
conspiring to commit extortion. Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
80
81
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a grand jury.87 For instance, in United States v. DiNapoli, several
defendants were accused of running a bid-rigging scheme for concrete
construction jobs.88 A grand jury returned an indictment against all of
the defendants; however, the grand jury continued investigating to
identify other construction projects affected and other participants in the
scheme.89 Two witnesses testified before the grand jury that they did not
know about the bid-rigging scheme.90 The prosecutor was skeptical of
each witness‘s testimony, but the prosecutor refrained from confronting
either with evidence because the prosecutor did not want to give away
the identification of witnesses cooperating with the government or
wiretapped conversations.91
During the trial, the defendants attempted to call the two witnesses
to testify, but both asserted their Fifth Amendment rights against self-

See United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 52324 (1st Cir. 1997) (adopting a narrow
interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) to find former testimony inadmissible because the
government does not have the same motivation to discredit and question a witness during
a grand jury proceeding as it does during trial); United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909,
91315 (2d Cir. 1993) (using a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) and stating that
assessing similar motive goes beyond the simple determination of whether the government
takes the same side on the same issue).
88
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 910–11. The evidence showed the existence of a ―Club‖ consisting
of six concrete construction companies. Id. at 910. From 1980 to 1985, the companies rigged
bids on ―nearly every high-rise construction project in Manhattan involving more than $2
million of concrete work.‖ Id. The Genovese family and other organized crime figures
participated in the scheme. Id.
89
Id. The indictment alleged certain aspects of criminal activity. Id.
90
Id. at 911. The two witnesses were Frederick DeMatteis and Pasquale Bruno. Id.
DeMatteis appeared before the grand jury three times. Id. During the first two
appearances, the government asked DeMatteis background questions and questions about
the construction industry. Id. During the third appearance, DeMatteis denied being
instructed not to bid on projects and being aware of a two percent arrangement. Id. The
prosecutor only briefly cross-examined DeMatteis because he did not want to give up vital
information. Id. Additionally, Bruno denied being aware of the ―Club‖ and the two
percent arrangement. Id. The prosecutor only briefly cross-examined Bruno, and the grand
jury expressed concern to the prosecutor that Bruno did not answer questions truthfully.
Id.
91
Id. The prosecutor did not want to disclose the identity of undisclosed witnesses
cooperating with the government or wiretapped conversations that did not corroborate
DeMatteis‘s testimony. Id. In his dissent in United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 505 U.S.
317, 329 (1992), Justice Stevens argued that when the government refuses to examine a
grand jury witness because of an ongoing investigation, it is inaccurate to say the
government did not have a similar motive to examine the witness. The more accurate
statement is that the government had a similar motive but decided not to pursue that
motive. Salerno III, 505 U.S. at 329. Failing to examine a witness because of an ongoing
investigation is a reason to forego cross-examination, but that does not undermine the fact
that the government possessed an opportunity and similar motive. Id. at 330.
87
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incrimination.92 The district court refused to admit the testimony under
Rule 804(b)(1) and the Second Circuit agreed. 93 The Second Circuit held
that determining whether a similar opportunity and motive exists
requires the evaluation of three different factors.94 First, courts must
look at ―whether the party resisting the offered testimony at a pending
proceeding had at a prior proceeding an interest of substantially similar
intensity to prove (or disprove) the same side of a substantially similar
issue.‖95 Second, courts must assess the prior cross-examination by
looking at what was available but not pursued. 96 Finally, courts must
examine what is at stake and the burden of proof. 97 Here, the Second
Circuit held the prosecutor did not have a similar motive because the
grand jury already indicted the defendants.98 Thus, the Second Circuit
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911. The district court judge held that generally a prosecutor‘s
motive during the investigatory stages of a case is different than the prosecutor‘s motive
during trial; therefore, Rule 804(b)(1) was not satisfied. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V. (―No
person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .‖).
93
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911, 915. The Second Circuit originally held that the district court
erred by excluding the grand jury testimony and ordered a new trial. United States v.
Salerno (Salerno I), 937 F.2d 797, 806–07 (2d Cir. 1991). However, on remand from the
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit adopted a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) and
held that the grand jury testimony did not satisfy the rule‘s requirements. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d
at 915.
94
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15. Some judges believe that evidence given before a grand
jury is not necessarily reliable because the testimony is not subject to vigorous crossexamination and the witness may lie because he usually appears under a grant of
immunity. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v.
West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1138–39 (4th Cir. 1978).
95
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15; see also, e.g., State v. Farquharson, 731 N.W.2d 797, 803
(Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (using the factors listed in DiNapoli to determine whether a similar
motive is present).
96
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15. To a lesser extent, the court should also look at the crossexamination during the earlier proceeding and take into account ―what was undertaken
and what was available but forgone.‖ Id. at 915. These factors are relevant on the issue of
similar motive, but the factors are not conclusive. Id. ―[E]xaminers will [always] be able to
suggest lines of questioning that were not pursued at a prior proceeding.‖ Id. at 914. The
unused ways of challenging testimony are relevant to the ―similar motive‖ inquiry, but
unused methods are only a single factor to consider. Id.
97
Id. at 914–15; see also, e.g., Michael M. Martin, The Former-Testimony Exception in the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 IOWA L. REV. 547, 562–65 (1972) (analyzing factors,
such as the purpose of and the burden of proof at a previous proceeding, and the possible
effect on the motive to develop testimony).
98
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 914–15. ―First, . . . there existed no putative defendant as to whom
probable cause was in issue.‖ Id. at 915. Second, the Second Circuit held
the prosecutor had no interest in showing that the denial of the Club‘s
existence was false. The grand jury had already been persuaded, at
least by the low standard of probable cause, to believe that the Club
existed and that the defendants had participated in it to commit
crimes. It is fanciful to think that the prosecutor would have had any
substantial interest in showing the falsity of the witnesses‘ denial of the
92
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adopted a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) because the court
examined the prosecutor‘s motive at a fine level to determine whether
the prosecutor had the same motive during the grand jury proceeding as
he did during trial.99
Club‘s existence just to persuade the grand jury to add one more
project to the indictment.
Id. Finally, the grand jury told the prosecutor that they did not believe Bruno testified
truthfully. Id. Therefore, the prosecutor did not have any interest in disproving the
witnesses‘ testimony when the grand jury already thought the testimony was inaccurate.
Id. The Second Circuit also discussed the various motives a prosecutor may have for
asking questions to a grand jury witness that may be lying. Id. ―The prosecutor might
want to afford the witness a chance to embellish the lie, thereby strengthening the case for a
subsequent perjury prosecution. Or the prosecutor might want to provoke the witness into
volunteering some critical new fact in the heat of an emphatic protestation of innocence.‖
Id.
99
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912–14. In the dissent, Judge Miner, Judge Pratt, and Judge
Altimari argued that the prosecutor had the same motive and opportunity. Id. at 916
(Miner, J., Pratt, J., & Altimari, J., dissenting). The dissent argued the majority applies
a gloss to the language of the rule that would find a similar motive
only when the party against whom the testimony is offered had an
interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or disprove) the
same side of a substantially similar issue. As a practical matter, the
gloss effectively rewrites the rule from similar motive to same motive.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation markss omitted). The dissent argued the
majority‘s application of Rule 804(b)(1) was stricter than the rule requires. Id. In addition,
the dissent stated the following:
[The majority‘s approach] could also prove to be extremely difficult to
administer, for on its face [the] test would require the district judge to
compare the intensity of interest that the prosecutor possessed before
the grand jury with his intensity of interest at trial. Careful
examination of those two states of the prosecutor‘s mind would
require a district judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing not only into
what information was available to the prosecutor at the two different
times, but also into what he was thinking about that information at
both of those times.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The dissent also criticized the majority for accepting
the prosecutor‘s argument that he already secured an indictment against the defendants
and that the prosecutor did not think any more witnesses were going to be added when the
witnesses were examined; therefore, probable cause was not an issue when DeMatteis and
Bruno testified. Id. The dissent argued that
[i]f all these things were true, then why was the prosecutor using the
grand jury at all? Could it have been simply a discovery device to
develop more evidence to present at trial on the indictment he already
had? If that were the case, however, the prosecutor‘s continuing use of
the grand jury would have been improper.
Id.; see also United States. v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (discussing that
prosecutors cannot use grand juries to go on ―arbitrary fishing expeditions,‖ and grand
juries should not be used with an intent to harass); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding prosecutors
cannot use grand juries to prepare a pending indictment for trial). The dissent concluded
by stating that the majority leaves the decision of whether Rule 804(b)(1) applies in the
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Moreover, in United States v. Omar, a federal grand jury indicted two
defendants for money laundering, bank larceny, and conspiracy. 100 A
witness testified in front of the grand jury, denying both taking any
money from the defendant and helping the defendant put cash into
different bank accounts.101 The witness died before trial, and when the
defense sought to admit the witness‘s prior testimony under Rule
804(b)(1), the district court held that the evidence was inadmissible.102
On appeal, the First Circuit held that the government did not have a
similar motive and opportunity during trial as it did during the grand
jury proceeding.103 The First Circuit held that the government likely
wanted to protect key witnesses or go after the witness later to convict
him of perjury.104 The court noted that it is rarely essential to discredit a
control of the prosecutor, which is ―at odds with the main objective of going to
trial―permitting the jury, not the prosecutor, to determine what is the truth.‖ DiNapoli, 8
F.3d at 917.
100
United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 520 (1st Cir. 1997). Investigators believed that
Ferrara and Omar robbed a Brinks armored truck of roughly $900,000. Id.
101
Id. at 521. During the grand jury proceeding, a friend of the defendants also testified
that one of the defendants brought a trash bag full of money to her house on the night of
the robbery. Id. The witness also stated the defendant bragged about using a gun during
the robbery and that he buried some of the money. Id. The defense attorney crossexamined the witness and brought up the fact that the witness denied having any
knowledge about the robbery during previous grand jury testimony. Id.
102
Id. Omar received a sentence of four years in prison, three years supervised release,
and was forced to pay restitution of $908,750. Id.
103
Id. at 523–24. In United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650, 654 (1st Cir. 1990), the First
Circuit held Rule 804(b)(1) did not apply to testimony from grand juries. Omar, 104 F.3d at
523. However, the First Circuit decision is expressly overruled by the Supreme Court‘s
decision in United States v. Salerno (Salerno I), 505 U.S. 317 (1992). In Salerno I, the Supreme
Court held Rule 804(b)(1) applied to grand jury proceedings. 505 U.S. at 327. The Second
Circuit adopted the same position on remand in United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914
(2d Cir. 1993). Furthermore, the First Circuit stated there is confusion within the circuits as
to whether 804(b)(1) applies to grand juries. Omar, 104 F.3d at 523. Defendants may have a
hard time satisfying the similar opportunity and motive test because some courts doubt
whether Rule 804(b)(1) should apply to testimony from grand juries. Id.; see also, e.g.,
United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding that grand jury
testimony cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 804(b)(1)); United States v. Dent, 984 F.2d
1453, 1462 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that grand jury testimony does not fit within any of the
hearsay exceptions in Rule 804).
104
Omar, 104 F.3d at 524. The First Circuit discussed that an argument to admit the
grand jury witness‘s testimony because of fairness could be made. Id. The First Circuit
noted that the testimony was important to the defendants‘ case. Id. The grand jury
witness‘s testimony was self-serving and suspect, but the government could have easily
undermined the testimony at trial through another witness‘s testimony. Id. Moreover, if
every ruling based on 804(b)(1) is ad hoc, predicting the outcome is nearly impossible and
courts have a hard time implementing policy. Id. ―And rules themselves are debatable:
one respected evidence code proposed that ‗hearsay . . . is admissible if . . . the
declarant . . . is unavailable.‘‖ Id. (quoting ALI, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 503
(1942)). However, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain ―a broad catch-all exception for
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grand jury witness because of the lower burden of proof during the
grand jury proceeding, and the government can call numerous witnesses
and select its own witnesses.105 Thus, the First Circuit used a narrow
interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1).106
Rule 102 states that the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
to secure fairness, conserve judicial resources, and prevent unnecessary
waste.107 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide a framework for
consistent application of what evidence is admissible in court. 108 The
two different interpretations of Rule 804(b)(1) are particularly troubling
in criminal cases because a defendant‘s ability to present exculpatory
grand jury evidence can depend on how the court interprets similar
motive.109
III. ANALYSIS OF ―SIMILAR MOTIVE‖ AND ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS
Interpreting similar motive is not easy for courts because the
Supreme Court has never given courts guidance on how to determine
whether there is a similar motive, and the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not define ―similar motive.‖110 Rule 804(b)(1) simply states that former
testimony is admissible when the party against whom the testimony is
offered had a prior opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by cross, direct, or redirect examination. 111 Thus, the appellate
courts are left to choose the standards to use to determine what
constitutes similar motive.112 First, Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2 explore

hearsay supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.‖ Omar, 104 F.3d at 524
(internal quotation marks omitted).
105
United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997). Rule 804(b)(1) and the
advisory committee‘s notes do not make clear how equivalent the opportunities to examine
a witness need to be. Id. at 523 n.2. ―There are obviously issues of degree and may be other
variables (like fault) that bear upon the answer, which is probably best left to case-by-case
development.‖ Id.
106
Id. at 524.
107
See supra note 25 (providing the text for Rule 102).
108
See supra note 25 (providing the text for Rule 102).
109
See supra Part II.B.2.a and Part II.B.2.b (addressing the two different approaches the
appellate courts take to determine whether former testimony is admissible).
110
See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the similar motive element of Rule 804(b)(1) and what
courts look at to determine whether a similar motive is present); see also Weissenberger,
supra note 63, at 335–36 (suggesting that the Supreme Court should provide guidance on
how to interpret Rule 804(b)(1)).
111
See supra Part II.B.1 and Part II.B.2 (discussing Rule 804(b)(1) and how courts apply
the rule).
112
See supra Part II.B.2.a and Part II.B.2.b (discussing the two different approaches the
appellate courts take to determine whether former testimony is admissible).
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the effects of a broad interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive. 113
Second, Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 address the effects of a narrow
interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive.114 Finally, Part III.C.1
and Part III.C.2 address the effects of adding a ―reasonable examiner‖
standard to Rule 804(b)(1).115
A. Broad Interpretation of “Similar Motive”
A broad interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) finds that the government
has a similar motive to develop a witness‘s testimony during grand jury
proceedings as it does at trial because the prosecutor attempts to extract
testimony to indict the defendant and prove that the defendant is guilty
during both proceedings.116 Therefore, former testimony from the grand
jury proceeding is admissible. 117 A broad interpretation does not
examine the government‘s motives in-depth but instead focuses on
whether the prosecutor‘s motive during the grand jury proceeding and
at trial is to extract testimony to determine whether the defendant is
guilty.118 There are several benefits to using a broad interpretation of
Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive requirement. 119

See infra Part III.A.1 and Part III.A.2 (analyzing the positive and negative effects of a
broad interpretation of similar motive).
114
See infra Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 (analyzing the positive and negative effects of a
narrow interpretation of similar motive).
115
See infra Part III.C.1 and Part III.C.2 (analyzing the positive and negative effects of
adding a ―reasonable examiner‖ standard to Rule 804(b)(1)).
116
See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing the broad interpretation of similar motive and how
courts use it).
117
See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing the broad interpretation of similar motive and
suggesting that the government has a similar motive during a grand jury proceeding and at
trial so long as the government attempted to develop testimony incriminating the
defendant).
118
Compare United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
government had a similar motive during the grand jury proceeding as it did at trial
because during both proceedings the government attempted to develop testimony
incriminating the defendant), with United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 91415 (2d Cir.
1993) (using a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1) and stating that assessing similar
motive goes beyond the simple determination of whether the government takes the same
side on the same issue). In order for there to be a similar motive, the government must
―have a substantially similar degree of interest in prevailing‖ on the related issues at both
proceedings. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912.
119
See infra Part III.A.1 (providing the positive aspects of a broad interpretation of similar
motive).
113
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Positive Aspects of a Broad Interpretation

The biggest benefit to using a broad interpretation is that it is easy to
assess and produces consistent outcomes. 120 The broad interpretation
does not require courts to assess different factors, such as a prosecutor‘s
trial strategy and tactics, different burdens of proof between
proceedings, the government‘s ability to call its own witnesses, and
whether an investigation is ongoing.121 Courts and defendants know
what to expect with a broad interpretation of similar motive because
former testimony from a grand jury proceeding is admissible so long as
the prosecutor possessed a motivation to extract testimony aimed at the
defendant‘s guilt or innocence.122 Thus, a broad interpretation of similar
motive would produce consistent outcomes, and defendants could not
argue that the court treated them unfairly or that they did not receive a
fair trial.123
Moreover, a broad interpretation of similar motive favors the
accused in criminal cases because defendants can admit former
testimony without any hassle; consequently, the courts conserve judicial
resources.124 Courts would not waste judicial resources deliberating on
whether former testimony is admissible because the courts would apply
a simple test to determine whether to admit former testimony. 125 Liberal
See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing appellate court cases using a broad interpretation of
similar motive and that the inquiry requires the courts to consider if the government‘s
purpose during both proceedings focused on whether the defendant was guilty or
innocent).
121
See supra note 64 (introducing cases using a broad interpretation of similar motive).
But see supra note 87 (discussing cases using a narrow interpretation of similar motive).
122
See supra note 6 (explaining the importance of uniformity of the laws and consistent
application so that people know what to expect).
123
See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 95–97 (1979) (holding that the court violated the
defendant‘s right to due process by not admitting the statement of a co-defendant that the
prosecution wanted to exclude as hearsay); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294
(1973) (holding that the accused in a criminal trial must have the chance to defend and
present his case, and the right to call witnesses to support his case is essential to due
process); Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d 400, 410–12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (concluding that the
district court violated the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense by
excluding the transcript of an unavailable witness‘s grand jury testimony).
124
See supra note 118 (discussing a case illustrating a broad interpretation of similar
motive and a case illustrating a narrow interpretation).
125
United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1993). Judge Pratt argued in his
dissent that the majority‘s narrow interpretation of similar motive would present a difficult
challenge for the courts to administer because the judge would have ―to compare the
‗intensity of the interest‘ that the prosecutor possessed before the grand jury with his
‗intensity of interest‘ at the trial.‖ Id. Examining what is going through a prosecutor‘s
mind during the grand jury proceeding and at trial forces the courts to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to assess the information available to the prosecutor and what the
prosecutor thought about the information during the grand jury proceeding and at trial. Id.
120
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admission of former testimony would also satisfy the Federal Rules of
Evidence‘s ―liberal thrust‖ towards admissibility. 126
In addition,
allowing defendants to admit more former testimony would ensure the
courts do not violate defendants‘ due process rights because the court
would not prevent the defendants from introducing exculpatory grand
jury testimony that could reduce their sentences or prove their
innocence.127
Introducing exculpatory grand jury testimony to the jury ensures
that the defendant is provided with the proper chance to present
evidence before being convicted.128 This is essentially another safeguard
to prevent the court from wrongfully convicting a defendant.129 If the
defendant is allowed to present former testimony, he cannot argue that
the court wrongfully convicted him because he could not present
exculpatory grand jury testimony.130 A broad interpretation of similar
motive essentially favors the defendant in a criminal trial while
providing another safeguard to ensure the defendant receives due
process and is not wrongfully convicted. 131
A broad interpretation would also allow more evidence to reach the
jury and would allow the jury to make the final determination on how
126
See Beech Air Craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (stating that the Federal
Rules of Evidence contain a ―liberal thrust‖ towards admissibility); see also FED. R. EVID.
401–403 (defining relevance broadly). See generally, LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 6
(discussing the theory that the more evidence admitted, the more likely the goals of the
Federal Rules of Evidence will be satisfied).
127
See United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 956 (6th Cir. 1997) (reversing the district
court‘s decision that the prosecutor did not have a similar motive during trial as it did
during a grand jury proceeding and allowing the defendant to introduce exculpatory grand
jury testimony); see also supra note 69 (suggesting that courts cannot apply the hearsay rule
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice and to deprive a defendant of his right to
present a defense).
128
See supra notes 84, 85 and accompanying text (discussing that the court held the
prosecution had a similar motive at trial as it did during the grand jury proceeding so the
defendant could admit the exculpatory grand jury testimony).
129
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 917. The dissent concluded by stating that the majority leaves the
decision of whether Rule 804(b)(1) applies in the control of the prosecutor, which is ―at
odds with the main objective of going to trial―permitting the jury, not the prosecutor, to
determine what is the truth.‖ Id.
130
See United States v. Geiger, 263 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (admitting prior
testimony of an arresting officer from a suppression hearing under 804(b)(1)). The court
found that the legal and factual issues in the state and federal suppression hearing showed
that the defendant had a similar, if not identical motive during the proceedings. Id.
131
See United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1301 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
government has the same motive during trial as it did during the grand jury proceeding;
therefore, the court allowed the defendant to introduce the former testimony to the jury to
defend his case); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516–17 (4th Cir. 1979) (stating that
when a prosecutor has a chance to question a witness during a grand jury proceeding, the
testimony is admissible under Rule 804(b)(1)).
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much weight to give the former testimony.132 Allowing more evidence
to reach the jury will protect defendants from abuses of power by the
government.133 Providing the jury with the opportunity to assess how
much credibility to give former testimony is more likely to discover the
truth than a process conducted by the judge. 134 The right to a trial by
jury in criminal cases and being judged by one‘s peers is a fundamental
part of the American justice system, and the broad interpretation of
similar motive allows the jury to assess how credible the former
testimony is.135 Allowing the jury to assess how much weight to give
former testimony is consistent with one of the purposes of juries—to
make credibility determinations.136
In addition to letting the jury assess how much weight to give former
testimony, a broad interpretation of similar motive favors the defendant
in a criminal trial by giving the prosecutor less power, because the
prosecutor cannot refuse to immunize a witness and then exclude his
exculpatory grand jury testimony as hearsay. 137 A broad interpretation
of similar motive takes the power of controlling whether grand jury
testimony is admissible away from the prosecutor and puts the
prosecutor on the same level as the defendant with regards to admitting

See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 902 (1983). A broad approach is consistent with
the ―fundamental premise of our entire system of criminal jurisprudence that the purpose
of the jury is to sort out the true testimony from the false, the important matters from the
unimportant matters . . . when called upon to do so.‖ Id.
133
Massaro, supra note 50, at 512–13. Being judged by a jury is more likely to serve the
defendant‘s best interest because the input of all the jurors‘ opinions will reduce the
chances of short-sighted, unfair, or erroneous decisions. Id. at 511. A fact-finding process
done by multiple people will discover the ―truth‖ before a process that is only conducted
by one person. Id. The jurors inject the community‘s desire and the community‘s
conscience. Id. at 512. The jurors can protect the defendant from abuses of power by the
judge. Id. at 511.
134
Id. at 511–12. ―If this theoretical underpinning is correct, the jury is especially
valuable in the criminal case, because decisions about guilt or innocence reflect subjective
value judgments that have tremendous implications for the accused.‖ Id.
135
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see also Whirley v. State, 450 So. 2d 836,
840–41 (Fla. 1984) (suggesting that American society places an extreme importance on the
right to be judged by peers).
136
See Chadbourn, supra note 50, at 947 (suggesting that the jury‘s duty is to make
credibility determinations).
137
United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 505 U.S. 317, 324 (1992). The defendants in
Salerno argued that if a witness gives inculpatory grand jury testimony the government
grants immunity and examines the witness at trial. Id. Alternatively, if the witness gives
exculpatory testimony, the government refuses to grant immunity and argues the
testimony is hearsay. Id. In addition, if the witness testifies without immunity, the
government has the power to impeach the witness with his grand jury testimony under
Rule 801(d)(1)(A). See generally FED. R. EVID. 806 (giving the government the ability to
impeach a hearsay declarant if hearsay testimony is admitted).
132
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former testimony.138 Additionally, using a broad interpretation of
similar motive will prevent the prosecutor from potentially going on
arbitrary fishing expeditions during grand jury proceedings because the
testimony may be used to hurt the prosecutor‘s case during trial if the
defendant can easily admit the testimony under Rule 804(b)(1).139
Therefore, the broad interpretation of similar motive takes power away
from the prosecutor that he can use to the detriment of the defendant.140
2.

Negative Aspects of a Broad Interpretation

Contrarily, the broad interpretation of similar motive has some
negative effects because former testimony that is hearsay is easily
admitted.141 Hearsay testimony is often unreliable because the jury
cannot observe the witness‘s demeanor and the witness is not present for
cross-examination.142 One of the goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence
is to increase the accuracy and reliability of evidence that is admissible,
but a broad interpretation of similar motive does not increase the
reliability of evidence reaching the jury. 143 Therefore, if courts admit
United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 1992). Grand jury
proceedings favor the government because of ―the ex parte nature of the proceeding, the
leading questions by the government, the absence of the defendant, the tendency of a
witness to favor the government because of the grant of immunity, [and] the absence of
confrontation.‖ Id.
139
See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 299 (1991) (discussing that
prosecutors cannot use grand juries to go on arbitrary fishing expeditions); see also, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir.
1985) (holding that using a grand jury to prepare a pending indictment for trial is not
acceptable).
140
See, e.g., United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing the
judge to determine whether the government possessed a similar motive during the grand
jury proceeding as it did at trial); see also supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text
(discussing the factors the judge assessed to determine whether the prosecutor had a
similar motive).
141
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916. Several judges believe grand jury testimony is not reliable; see
also, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 1982) (suggesting that evidence
given before a grand jury does not help the evidence‘s reliability); United States v. West,
574 F.2d 1131, 1138–39 (4th Cir. 1978) (Widener, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
overestimated the reliability of grand jury testimony).
142
See Mercier, supra note 61, at 341 (suggesting that a narrow interpretation of similar
motive could potentially violate the right to effectively examine a witness).
143
Weissenberger, supra note 63, at 309 (discussing the trend towards an emphasis on
trustworthiness as the goal of evidentiary rules). Compare United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d
951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (using a broad interpretation and allowing the defendant to admit
former testimony by simply determining whether the prosecutor sought to extract
incriminating testimony against the defendant during both proceedings), with United
States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523–24 (1st Cir. 1997) (examining the prosecutor‘s motive indepth and finding that the prosecutor‘s motive during the grand jury proceeding was not
the same as it would be at trial).
138
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former testimony easily, there is a risk that inaccurate former testimony
will reach the jury and wrongly persuade the jurors. 144
Furthermore, the prosecution often has different motives during a
grand jury proceeding than at trial.145 If exculpatory grand jury
testimony is easily admitted against the government, the prosecutor will
have to change his strategy for examining witnesses during grand jury
proceedings.146 This may not be fair to the prosecution because the
prosecutor may not want to disclose information about an ongoing
investigation.147 Also, the prosecutor does not have any incentive to
heavily cross-examine a perjurious witness because the prosecutor can
charge the witness for perjury or call upon the witness later. 148 Thus, a
broad interpretation of similar motive does not favor the government
because the prosecutor may not have any incentive to develop a
witness‘s testimony during a grand jury proceeding, and a broad
interpretation of similar motive would not take that into account. 149
Easily admitting former testimony will not give the prosecutor any
incentive to examine a witness during a grand jury proceeding if he
knows the testimony will be admissible at trial.150 This may have a
See supra notes 35–38 (addressing the dangers of admitting hearsay and allowing the
jury to hear evidence that may not be reliable); see also Mercier, supra note 61, at 341 (noting
that a broad interpretation of similar motive could pose a problem by preventing a party
from using the right to effectively examine a witness).
145
See Omar, 104 F.3d at 523 (discussing that the government does not have the same
motive to discredit and question a witness during a grand jury proceeding as it does
during trial); DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 913 (discussing that the government often treats a witness
differently during a grand jury proceeding because the prosecutor does not want to
disclose information about an ongoing investigation or the identity of informants).
146
United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 237–38 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that a
prosecutor may not seek to discredit a grand jury witness and that the issues before the
grand jury will not necessarily be the same as those at trial). If the court consistently
admits former testimony by adopting a broad interpretation, the prosecutor‘s strategy may
change and he may examine the witness differently. Id.
147
See DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 911 (averring that the prosecutor did not want to disclose the
identity of witnesses cooperating with the government‘s investigation or wiretapped
conversations that did not corroborate the witness‘s testimony).
148
Salerno IV, 974 F.2d at 237 (explaining that the prosecutor can excuse a perjurious
witness and continue the grand jury investigation, while retaining the option of going after
the witness later for perjury, or recall the witness later when the investigation produces
more evidence with which to confront the witness).
149
Compare United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 443–44 (5th Cir. 2004) (examining only
whether the defendant‘s motive at the grand jury hearing and at trial was to discredit a
witness and holding that former testimony was admissible), with State v. Farquharson, 731
N.W.2d 797, 803 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (using the factors listed in DiNapoli to determine
whether a similar motive is present).
150
DePalma, supra note 63, at 574. The prosecutor typically does not want to confront
witnesses during grand jury proceedings with evidence that will reveal confidential
sources or information about an ongoing investigation. Id.
144
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chilling effect on the prosecutor during grand jury proceedings and
make him change his strategy when examining a witness, which could
have a negative effect on the government‘s investigatory ability. 151 The
public and the government have a strong interest in punishing criminals
and getting to the bottom of legal disputes, but using a broad
interpretation of similar motive may cause the prosecutor to be cautious
when he questions a witness during a grand jury proceeding because the
testimony may resurface and hurt his case at trial.152 A broad
interpretation of similar motive may require the prosecutor to alter his
strategy during the grand jury proceedings and may make the
prosecutor‘s job of prosecuting criminals more difficult.153 As a result of
the burden placed on the prosecutor by using a broad interpretation of
similar motive, some courts favor using a narrow interpretation. 154
B. Narrow Interpretation of “Similar Motive”
Rather than using a broad interpretation of similar motive, some
courts use a narrow interpretation of similar motive to determine
whether the prosecutor‘s motive during a grand jury proceeding is the
same as it would be at trial.155 Like the broad interpretation of similar
motive, the narrow interpretation has both positive and negative aspects

Id. Grand jury proceedings are non-adversarial in nature, and there is a lack of a
competitive climate because the defendant and the defense counsel are not present. Id.
The prosecutor only needs to establish probable cause, whereas during the trial the burden
of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. If former testimony is easily admitted against
the government, the prosecutor may hesitate to question witnesses or change strategy.
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 915.
152
United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 955–56 (6th Cir. 1997). A broad interpretation of
similar motive does not take into account factors such as the different burdens of proof, the
evidence available to the prosecutor, desire to maintain confidentiality of information
pertaining to an ongoing investigation, lack of evidence, and the non-adversarial context of
the grand jury proceeding. See id. (finding grand jury testimony admissible because the
prosecutor had the same motive to develop a witness‘s testimony during both the grand
jury hearing and at trial).
153
See id. (adopting a broad interpretation of similar motive and stating that the witness‘s
testimony could have had an impact on the verdict). A narrow interpretation of similar
motive provides more protection to the prosecution from having former testimony
admitted against it during trial. United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 379–80 (D.C. Cir.
2006). A broad interpretation only considers whether the prosecutor attempted to extract
incriminating testimony, which allows the defendant to introduce exculpatory grand jury
testimony more easily. United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2009).
154
See supra Part II.B.2.b (summarizing the narrow interpretation of similar motive).
155
See supra note 70 (suggesting that the district courts should use a fact specific inquiry
to determine whether the government possessed a similar motive).
151
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to it.156 The next sections discuss the positive and negative effects of a
narrow interpretation.157
1.

Positive Aspects of a Narrow Interpretation

The narrow interpretation of similar motive provides the greatest
benefit to the prosecutor because defendants have a difficult time
admitting exculpatory grand jury testimony under a narrow
interpretation.158 The narrow interpretation favors the prosecutor by
increasing the chances that the prosecutor will successfully argue that
the court should exclude former testimony as hearsay because the
prosecution did not have a similar motive during the grand jury
proceeding as it would at trial.159 The narrow interpretation of similar
motive recognizes the fact that prosecutors may not fully examine an
exonerating grand jury witness because the prosecutor does not want to
give up vital information about an ongoing investigation. 160 Keeping
information about ongoing investigations confidential is also in the
public‘s interest because society does not want prosecutors giving up
vital information in court that could inhibit law enforcement
investigations and make it harder to catch criminals. 161
See infra Part III.B.2 (showing some of the problems that arise when courts use a
narrow interpretation of similar motive to assess similar motive).
157
See infra Part III.B.1 and Part III.B.2 (discussing the positive effects of a narrow
interpretation, followed by the negative effects).
158
See Carson, 455 F.3d at 379–80 (suggesting that courts should use a fact specific inquiry
to determine similar motive). Narrow interpretations require the court to look at factors,
such as whether the party possessed a substantially similar motive, what is at stake, the
burden of proof, and what lines of questioning occurred during the prior crossexamination before the court admits former testimony under Rule 804(b)(1). United States
v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993).
159
See Weissenberger, supra note 63, at 298. The narrow interpretation is more cautious
and takes into account tactical considerations of attorneys representing their clients‘
interests. Id. Attorneys may use different strategies during the two proceedings, even
though the issue may be the same. Id.
160
Weissenberger, Transcripts, supra note 64, at 344 (discussing the intended use of Rule
804(b)(1)). The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, who created changes
to Rule 804(b)(1), did not think it was fair to admit former testimony when a party‘s
interests were not properly represented in the prior proceeding. Id. Therefore, one can
argue that the Judiciary Committee intended for the prosecutor‘s interests to be taken into
account before admitted former testimony from a grand jury proceeding. Id. at 34446.
161
United States v. Salerno (Salerno II), 952 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1991). The government
will hesitate to cross-examine witnesses because there is a chance the cross-examination
will reveal the identity and existence of confidential sources. Id. See generally BRENNER &
LOCKHART, supra note 62, at 186–233 (stressing the importance of maintaining the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings); FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 62, at 23–24 (arguing that the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings is a good idea). The most important reasons for
maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings are
156
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Additionally, in a grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor‘s only goal
is to secure an indictment, and the burden of proof that must be met to
secure an indictment during the grand jury proceeding is only probable
cause.162 When the prosecutor believes the probable cause burden is
met, he does not have any reason to continue examining exonerating
witnesses because he believes the grand jury will likely indict. 163 During
grand jury proceedings, the prosecution may not possess the best
evidence to impeach a witness that is lying, and the government may not
even know the witness is lying until later.164 The prosecutor does not
have any incentive to strongly cross-examine a witness because if the
witness is lying the prosecutor can bring a perjury charge against the
witness later.165 The narrow interpretation favors the government by
protecting the prosecutor from these potential problems and does not
make the prosecutor treat exonerating witnesses as trial witnesses. 166

(1) [t]o prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its
deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation
of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may testify before
[the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4)
to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have
information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect
[the] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact
that he has been under investigation, and from the expense of standing
trial where there was no probability of guilt.
Id. (first alteration added).
162
See supra note 145 and accompanying text (suggesting that the government does not
treat a witness the same during a grand jury proceeding as it would at trial).
163
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 912–13 (arguing that the prosecutor does not have as much at stake
during a grand jury proceeding as he does at trial)
164
See Salerno II, 952 F.2d at 626 (discussing why a prosecutor may have a different
motive during a grand jury proceeding than he would at trial).
165
See United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that
the prosecutor‘s motive during the grand jury proceeding is not the same as it is during
trial). Prosecutors cannot confront a witness suspected of perjury with all the evidence it
has, otherwise the prosecutor would risk exposing an ongoing investigation, the identity of
informants, and evidence revealing the nature of investigation techniques being used. Id.
The prosecutor does not have any motive to discredit the witness during the grand jury
proceeding because the prosecutor can simply pursue a perjury charge later or examine the
witness again when more evidence is available. Id. Moreover, discrediting a grand jury
witness is usually unnecessary because of the lower burden of proof and the government‘s
ability to call its own witness and additional witnesses at its leisure. United States v. Omar,
104 F.3d 519, 523 (1st Cir. 1997).
166
See generally Zenith Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1252 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (taking into account factors such as the type of prior proceeding, trial strategy,
number of parties and issues, and the possible penalties or financial stakes to determine
whether there is a similar motive). Assessing multiple factors ensures the party whom
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The narrow interpretation also fulfills one of the goals of the hearsay
rule by increasing the reliability and accuracy of evidence presented to
the jury.167 Hearsay is often unreliable because the jury cannot observe
the witness‘s demeanor, and by using the narrow interpretation the
likelihood that potentially unreliable hearsay will reach the jury
decreases.168 If courts easily admit former testimony, there is a risk that
inaccurate former testimony will reach the jury and wrongly persuade
the jurors.169 Therefore, the narrow interpretation of similar motive
helps prevent hearsay from reaching the jury. 170
2.

Negative Aspects of a Narrow Interpretation

Alternatively, the narrow interpretation also has some negative
effects because the courts have to weigh many different factors to
determine if there is a similar motive. 171
Under the narrow
interpretation, the courts must assess broad factors, such as ―whether the
party resisting the offered testimony at a pending proceeding had at a
prior proceeding an interest of substantially similar intensity to prove (or
disprove) the same side of a substantially similar issue.‖ 172 Courts also
should examine what is at stake, the burden of proof, and look at the
prior examination to see what line of questioning was available to the
It is difficult to ascertain the
prosecutor but not developed. 173

former testimony is admitted against had a prior opportunity to develop the unavailable
witness‘s testimony. Id.
167
See supra notes 35–40 and accompanying text (addressing the multiple ways in which
the hearsay rule increases the reliability of evidence that reaches the jury).
168
See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (addressing the benefits of crossexamination and the benefits of allowing the jury to observe a witness subject to crossexamination).
169
See supra notes 49–50 (discussing how attempting to admit former testimony presents
a hearsay problem for courts); see also Mercier, supra note 61, at 341 (arguing that a narrow
interpretation of similar motive would make it easier to argue that a party‘s motive at trial
is not similar to what it was during the grand jury proceeding).
170
Compare United States v. McFall, 558 F.3d 951, 963 (9th Cir. 2009) (using a broad
interpretation of similar motive and allowing the defendant to introduce exculpatory grand
jury testimony), with Omar, 104 F.3d at 521–24 (adopting a narrow interpretation of similar
motive because during the grand jury proceeding the government likely wanted to protect
the confidentiality of witnesses or go after the witness later for perjury).
171
See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (providing examples of factors courts
should use to determine whether a similar motive is present).
172
United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 914–15 (2d Cir. 1993); see supra notes 95–97 and
accompanying text (listing the factors the court used).
173
See supra note 96 (stating that the factors are all relevant to whether a similar motive is
present, but the factors are not conclusive).
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prosecutor‘s tactical considerations and maneuvers, and examining these
broad factors will be difficult and costly for the courts. 174
The narrow interpretation of similar motive does not favor the
defendant in a criminal trial because the narrow interpretation can lead
to potential violations of a defendant‘s due process rights by excluding
exculpatory grand jury testimony.175 Preventing a defendant from
admitting former testimony does not adequately ensure that the courts
will not violate the defendant‘s due process rights because the court is
more likely to exclude valuable evidence that could potentially violate
the defendant‘s right to present a defense.176 Accordingly, using a
narrow interpretation of similar motive may lead to violations of due
process rights because the defendant will not likely be able to present
evidence that could exonerate him or lessen his sentence.177
Not letting defendants introduce exculpatory grand jury testimony
by using a narrow interpretation of similar motive goes against the
Federal Rules of Evidence‘s ―liberal thrust‖ towards admissibility
because the court will likely exclude former testimony. 178 The narrow
interpretation prevents more evidence from reaching the jury and leaves
the determination of admissibility up to the judge. 179 Moreover, the
DiNapoli, 8 F.3d at 916. See supra note 99 (quoting the DiNapoli dissent‘s argument that
the administration of the majority‘s test could prove to be difficult).
175
See, e.g., Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (holding that the lower court violated
the defendant‘s right to due process by excluding the statement of a co-defendant as
hearsay); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 302 (1973) (holding that a defendant in
a criminal trial has a right to defend and present his case, and ―the hearsay rule may not be
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice‖); Feaster v. United States, 631 A.2d
400, 411–12 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to
present a defense required the court to admit a transcript of an unavailable witness‘s grand
jury testimony). Offering testimony to support one‘s case is a right that is essential to
receiving a fair trial. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972); Jenkins v.
McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 428–29 (1969); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
176
United States v. Omar, 104 F.3d 519, 523–24 (1st Cir. 1997) (using a narrow
interpretation of similar motive); see also supra note 69 (discussing situations where the
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense requires the admission of
evidence that the court would normally exclude).
177
See supra note 175 (discussing how courts cannot apply the hearsay rule
mechanistically to prevent the defendant from introducing evidence in his defense).
178
See LEONARD & GOLD, supra note 13, at 6 (suggesting that the Federal Rules of
Evidence favor admissibility and admitting more evidence is more likely to satisfy the
goals of the rules); see also FED. R. EVID. 401–403 (giving a broad definition of what evidence
is relevant); Beech Air Craft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988) (arguing that the
Federal Rules of Evidence favor admissibility and have a ―liberal thrust‖ towards
admissibility).
179
See supra Part II.B.2.b (providing illustrations of cases using the narrow interpretation
to exclude exculpatory grand jury testimony); see also supra note 51 (discussing the
importance of being judged by a jury of one‘s peers and letting the jury decide how much
174
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narrow interpretation favors the prosecutor in a criminal trial by
essentially allowing the prosecutor to decide whether former testimony
is admissible because if a witness offers incriminating evidence against a
defendant, the government may grant the witness immunity and allow
him to testify at trial.180 Conversely, if the testimony is exculpatory, the
government attempts to exclude the testimony as hearsay.181 This allows
the prosecutor to essentially control whether former testimony is
admissible, which goes against the main objective of going to trial—
allowing the jury, not the prosecutor, to decide what the truth is. 182
Preventing a defendant from admitting former testimony may not
ensure that the defendant is provided with the proper chance to present
evidence before being convicted.183 Thus, a narrow interpretation of
similar motive does not favor the defendant in a criminal trial because it
takes away a potential safeguard to ensure that the defendant receives
due process and is allowed to properly defend his case. 184
C. Judith M. Mercier’s Suggested Change to Rule 804(b)(1)
A possible revision to Rule 804(b)(1) that Judith M. Mercier
suggested is to add a ―reasonable examiner‖ standard. 185 The reasonable
weight to give evidence in order to protect the defendant from corruption, overzealous
prosecutors, and biased judges).
180
United States v. Salerno (Salerno III), 505 U.S. 317, 324 (1992). The prosecutor can
grant a witness use immunity if he offers incriminating evidence; however, the prosecutor
can also refuse to grant immunity and attempt to exclude the testimony as hearsay if the
witness gives exonerating testimony. Id.; see also supra note 99 (stating that the dissent in
United States v. DiNapoli thought a narrow interpretation of similar motive rewrote Rule
804(b)(1) by changing similar motive to same motive and that the majority‘s approach
essentially allows the prosecutor to decide whether the court will admit former testimony,
which prevents the jury from determining the truth).
181
See supra note 137 (describing how the prosecutor uses immunity to the disadvantage
of the defendant).
182
See supra notes 50–51, 133 (discussing the importance of the jury and the defendant‘s
right to be judged by his peers); see also supra notes 22, 50 (suggesting that the Federal Rules
of Evidence favor admissibility and letting the jury assess what is true).
183
See supra note 69 (providing cases that show courts cannot apply the hearsay rule
mechanistically to prevent the defendant from offering testimony to prove his innocence
because being able to offer testimony is a right that is essential to receiving a fair trial).
184
See supra note 51 (discussing the importance of allowing the jury to decide issues in
order to protect the defendant from overzealous prosecutors and potentially biased
judges); see also supra note 133 (arguing that a fact-finding process conducted by multiple
people is more likely to discover the truth than a process conducted by only one person).
185
See Mercier, supra note 61, at 337–42 (proposing that the courts should modify Rule
804(b)(1) by adding a ―reasonable examiner‖ standard to conserve adversarial fairness).
Judith M. Mercier is a practicing attorney at Holland & Knight in Florida. She received her
J.D. from the University of Miami School of Law and has a B.S. in accounting from the
University of Florida.
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examiner standard ensures that the party against whom the testimony is
offered possessed a similar motive to cross-examine the witness by
requiring a subjective analysis to determine whether a reasonable
examiner would have a similar motive to develop the witness‘s
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 186 Like the broad and
narrow interpretation of similar motive, adding reasonable examiner
standard to Rule 804(b)(1) has both negative and positive effects on the
judicial process.187
1.

Positive Aspects of Adding a ―Reasonable Examiner‖ Standard

One of the benefits to adding a reasonable examiner standard is that
the American judicial system is an adversarial system, and adding a
reasonable examiner standard to Rule 804(b)(1) further supports the
adversarial system.188 The reasonable examiner standard basically asks
whether a reasonable examiner in the situation would possess a similar
motive to develop the witness‘s testimony by direct, cross, or redirect
examination to advocate for his client. 189 By assessing what a reasonable
examiner would do, the reasonable examiner standard focuses on the
circumstances in the case and ensures that the party possessed a similar
motive and adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witness.190 The
reasonable examiner standard does not prevent former testimony from
being admitted when a litigant previously decided not to vigorously
examine a witness.191
2.

Negative Aspects of a ―Reasonable Examiner‖ Standard

In contrast, the reasonable examiner standard makes the similar
motive determination more difficult for courts by adding another
See id. at 342 (concluding that courts might hesitate to adopt the reasonable examiner
standard because it requires a subjective analysis).
187
See infra Part III.C.1 and Part III.C.2 (discussing the positive and negative effects of
adding a ―reasonable examiner‖ standard to Rule 804(b)(1)).
188
See Mercier, supra note 61, at 338 (proposing that the reasonable examiner standard
focuses on the circumstances in each case to ensure that courts do not admit former
testimony against a party that did not have a similar motive or a prior opportunity for
cross-examination).
189
See id. at 338–42 (providing a discussion of the reasonable examiner standard and
illustrating how courts can use the standard to decide whether to admit former testimony
under Rule 804(b)(1) to promote fairness).
190
Id.
191
United States v. Salerno (Salerno IV), 974 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1992); see also supra note
54 (proposing that Rule 804(b)(1) only requires that the party possess a valid opportunity
for cross-examination and whether the party took advantage of the opportunity is
irrelevant).
186
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element to consider when deciding whether former testimony is
admissible under Rule 804(b)(1).192 Not all lawyers think the same;
therefore, some lawyers may make different choices or tactical decisions
in certain situations.193 This type of situation could make it difficult for
courts to assess what a reasonable examiner would do under the
circumstances.194 Adding a reasonable examiner standard essentially
adds another vague term to Rule 804(b)(1).195 The reasonable examiner
standard removes counsel‘s role as strategic decision-maker and forces
courts to play lawyer; this does not help to determine when a similar
motive is present but further confuses the rule. 196
In summary, there are positive and negative consequences to each
interpretation, and there is no simple solution. 197 Courts need to reach a
compromise between the different approaches in order to balance the
competing interests of the prosecutor and the defendant and to promote
fairness and consistency.198
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Courts will continuously fail to promote fairness and consistency by
using either a broad or narrow interpretation of similar motive. 199 A
defendant‘s ability to introduce exculpatory grand jury testimony during
a trial currently depends entirely on the circuit in which the case is
See Mercier, supra note 61, at 342 (stating that the reasonable examiner standard fits
within the vague meaning of Rule 804(b)(1)).
193
See supra note 99 (discussing that courts cannot easily determine what a lawyer is
thinking or the strategies the lawyer employed and attempting to do so would require
courts to conduct a burdensome evidentiary hearing).
194
See supra note 125 (discussing that examining what is going through a prosecutor‘s
mind during the grand jury proceeding and at trial forces the courts to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to assess the information available to the prosecutor, in addition to
what the prosecutor thought about the information during the grand jury proceeding and
at trial; therefore, figuring out the prosecutor‘s tactical decisions and thoughts will not be
easy for courts to assess).
195
See Mercier, supra note 61, at 342 (stating that the ―reasonable examiner‖ standard fits
well with the nebulous meaning of opportunity and similar motive).
196
See supra note 125 (arguing that courts will have a hard time determining whether the
prosecutor possessed a similar motive because it is not easy to determine what is going
through the prosecutor‘s mind during a grand jury proceeding and at trial).
197
See supra Part III.A, III.B, and III.C (analyzing the positive and negative effects of the
different approaches courts use to determine whether a criminal defendant can admit
exculpatory grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(1)).
198
See infra Part IV (suggesting that courts should conduct a factual inquiry to determine
whether the government possesses a similar motive); see also supra note 8 (noting that the
purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to promote fairness and consistency regarding
evidence admitted during trials).
199
See supra Part III.A and Part III.B (analyzing the broad and narrow interpretations of
similar motive and how courts use the different interpretations).
192
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tried.200 For example, if the defendant‘s trial is in the Sixth Circuit, the
court will most likely allow the defendant to introduce exculpatory
grand jury testimony under a broad interpretation of similar motive. 201
In contrast, if the defendant‘s trial is in the Second Circuit, the court will
likely prohibit the defendant from admitting exculpatory grand jury
testimony under a narrow interpretation of similar motive. 202
The discord and inconsistency resulting from these two
interpretations of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive element is exactly what
the Federal Rules of Evidence attempt to avoid. 203 Rule 102 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence states that one of the goals of evidence law is
to secure fairness and prevent unjustifiable expense and delay. 204 In
order to promote fairness and consistency, courts should do away with
the broad and narrow interpretations, and instead courts should conduct
a factual inquiry by examining (1) what is at stake and the burden of
proof; (2) the government‘s interest; (3) the previous cross-examination;
and (4) the defendant‘s interest.
A. What is at Stake and the Burden of Proof
The first factor courts should examine is what is at stake and the
burden of proof. This requires the court to take into account that during
a grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor only needs to establish probable
cause to secure an indictment, but during a criminal trial, the burden of
proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. 205 Because of the difference in the
burden of proof, the prosecutor may not have the same motive during a
grand jury proceeding as he would at trial. On the other hand, the
defendant‘s freedom is at stake in a criminal case, and the defendant
may face a substantial amount of time in prison. Therefore, the use of
exculpatory grand jury testimony is likely very important for the
defendant.206
See supra Part II.B.2.a and II.B.2.b (discussing how circuit courts use a broad and
narrow interpretation of similar motive to determine whether to admit exculpatory grand
jury testimony).
201
See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text (summarizing the Sixth Circuit‘s
decision to adopt a broad interpretation of similar motive in United States v. Foster).
202
See supra notes 88–99 and accompanying text (summarizing the Second Circuit‘s
decision to adopt a narrow interpretation of similar motive in United States v. DiNapoli).
203
See supra note 8 (stating that courts must use the Federal Rules of Evidence to secure
fairness and to reach just results).
204
See supra note 25 (giving the text of Rule 102 and the purpose of the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
205
See supra note 105 (addressing the differences in the burden of proof during a grand
jury proceeding and during a criminal trial).
206
See supra notes 69, 175 (listing cases where courts state that giving the defendant the
opportunity to offer testimony in his defense is essential to a fair trial).
200
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B. Government’s Interest
The court must also consider the government‘s interest in protecting
witnesses and preserving the confidentiality of ongoing investigations.
This also includes the fact that discrediting a grand jury witness is rarely
important because the prosecutor can always charge a witness later for
perjury. Courts should also consider the evidence available to the
prosecutor because more evidence may become available later, and the
courts do not want to have a chilling effect on prosecutors during grand
jury proceedings by easily admitting all exculpatory grand jury
testimony.
C. Previous Cross-Examination
Next, the courts should consider the previous cross-examination,
focusing on the lines of questioning the prosecutor used and what lines
of questioning were available to the prosecutor but not pursued. 207
Prosecutors can always argue they did not pursue certain lines of
questioning during grand jury proceedings, and the courts should take
that into consideration; however, the lines of questioning the prosecutor
did not pursue are only one factor to consider. This factor will give the
court a better idea of whether the prosecutor purposely avoided asking
certain questions in order to protect the identity of witnesses or the
confidentiality of ongoing investigations.
D. Defendant’s Interest
Last, courts should assess the defendant‘s interest in presenting
evidence to defend his case and protecting his constitutional right to
present a defense.208 The defendant in a criminal case may lose his
freedom if he is convicted; therefore, the courts should ensure that the
defendant has the opportunity to present evidence to support his case. 209
The Federal Rules of Evidence have a liberal thrust towards
admissibility, and the jury traditionally assesses the truthfulness of
See supra note 96 (discussing how the court should examine the lines of questioning
the prosecutor used or avoided during the grand jury proceeding).
208
See supra notes 69, 175 (discussing the importance of preserving the defendants right
to present a defense to exonerate himself).
209
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). In order for a defendant to receive a
fair trial, the defendant must have the opportunity to examine witnesses and offer
testimony. See, e,g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972); Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U.S. 411, 428–29 (1969); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967); In re Oliver, 333
U.S. 257, 273 (1948). Courts should not apply the hearsay rule or the former testimony
exception mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 30203.
207
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facts.210 Thus, courts should generally favor allowing defendants to
present exculpatory grand jury testimony so the jury may determine
how much weight to give the testimony and whether the testimony is
credible.
In brief, all of these factors are relevant to whether a prosecutor has a
similar motive during a grand jury proceeding and at trial, but none of
the factors alone are conclusive. The courts should assess these factors
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the government possessed
a similar motive. If the federal courts adopt these factors, decisions will
be more consistent.
In addition to examining these factors, courts should place the
burden on the government to justify exclusion of grand jury testimony.
Courts should favor admitting exculpatory grand jury testimony in
order to let the jury decide how much weight to give the testimony.
Similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 403, the similar motive
element of Rule 804(b)(1) should favor admissibility and a finding of
similar motive.211 Courts do not want to prevent prosecutors from using
grand juries or hesitating to question witnesses during grand jury
proceedings, but protecting the constitutional rights of the defendants
and preserving their ability to present a defense warrants the extra
burden that the prosecutor may face.212 Therefore, an interpretation of
similar motive that favors admitting exculpatory grand jury testimony
satisfies the plain meaning rule and is more likely to satisfy the goals of
the Federal Rules of Evidence without producing an unconstitutional
result.213
Citizens lose faith in the justice system when courts apply laws and
rules inconsistently. The public, prosecutors, and defendants all expect
laws to apply consistently regardless of the circuit trying the case. When

See supra notes 51, 178 (suggesting that the Federal Rules of Evidence generally favor
admitting evidence and that the American society thinks allowing the jury to determine the
truth is very important in order to protect defendants from potentially overzealous
prosecutors and biased judges).
211
See supra notes 22, 126 (suggesting that the Federal Rules of Evidence favor
admissibility and that the Federal Rules suggest that a broad interpretation of relevant
evidence is best because more evidence is admitted under a broad interpretation).
212
See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text (suggesting that prosecutors will not
ask witnesses certain questions during grand jury proceedings if the prosecutor knows the
testimony is admissible at trial); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 30203
(1973) (holding that courts cannot use the hearsay rule to defeat the ends of justice and that
sometimes a defendant‘s constitutional rights warrant admitting hearsay testimony).
213
See supra note 48 (addressing the plain meaning rule and how courts can use the rule
to interpret the Federal Rules of Evidence, while also explaining that how the dictionary
defines the term similar as having characteristics in common, but similar does not mean
identical).
210
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courts apply laws consistently, the public knows what to expect and no
one can argue the court treated them unfairly or that the court prevented
them from defending and presenting their case.214 Until there is a
consistent interpretation of Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive element, the
public, prosecutors, and defendants will continue to guess whether the
court will use a narrow or broad interpretation of similar motive and
courts will continuously waste resources litigating which approach to
use.
V. CONCLUSION
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court on how to interpret
Rule 804(b)(1)‘s similar motive element, the split amongst the circuit
courts will likely continue to worsen. Completely excluding or routinely
admitting exculpatory grand jury testimony does not serve the interests
of the justice system or the Federal Rules of Evidence. The fairest
approach between the two extremes is for the courts to assess factors on
a case-by-case basis to determine whether the government possessed a
similar motive and to provide predictability.
Currently, John and his attorney await the Seventh Circuit‘s decision
on whether the exculpatory grand jury testimony is admissible. John
appears extremely nervous and his heart is racing because he
understands the ramifications the court‘s decision will have on his life. If
courts stopped relying on a broad or narrow interpretation of similar
motive, John‘s nervousness and worries would disappear because the
court would analyze: (1) what is at stake and the burden of proof, (2) the
government‘s interest, (3) the previous cross-examination; and (4) the
defendant‘s interest to determine whether to admit the exculpatory
grand jury testimony.
By analyzing these factors, courts will become more consistent at
determining whether there is a similar motive, while also protecting the
interests of the defendant and the prosecutor. Further, the prosecution
will no longer have the ability to control whether exculpatory grand jury
testimony is admissible because the prosecutor cannot grant immunity
and then attempt to exclude the testimony as hearsay. If the Seventh
Circuit adopted these factors, the court would ensure that John‘s
constitutional right to present evidence in his defense is protected, while

See supra Part II.B.2.a and II.B.2.b (discussing how circuit courts use a broad and
narrow interpretation of similar motive to determine whether to admit exculpatory grand
jury testimony and the cases supporting each interpretation).
214
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also protecting the prosecutor‘s interest in prosecuting criminals and
preventing the disclosure of information about ongoing investigations.
William J. Horvath*

J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law (2011); B.S., Psychology,
Valparaiso University (2008). I would like to thank my mom, Gretchen, and my dad, Billy,
for their constant support, love, and guidance. Further, I would like to thank Erika, Sarah,
Anna, and my friends for always being there for me. Thanks to Professor Susan Stuart for
always having an open door and being an excellent mentor and Professor Ivan
Bodensteiner for his assistance with this Note.
*

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

